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Abstract
Part I examines in detail the two conflicting laws that are the basis of this Comment—Title III of the
Bioterrorism Act and the SPS Agreement—focusing on those portions of Title III that adversely impact
international trade. Part I also presents the WTO case EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), the first food regulation case disputed in the WTO system for a violation of the SPS Agreement.
This case clarified the two major principles of the SPS Agreement that are explored in this Comment: the
prohibition on discrimination and the obligation to support trade–restrictive measures with an analytical risk
assessment. As such, it will be used as a tool to explain these principles and illustrate how a WTO member
could successfully dispute Title III’s compliance with the SPS Agreement.
Part II of this Comment analyzes Title III’s conformity with the SPS Agreement. This Part establishes that
Title III is subject to the SPS Agreement because it is a sanitary measure designed to protect human life and
health from the threat of deliberate food contamination. Part II then argues that, while motivated by the real
threat of bioterrorism, Title III nonetheless violates the nondiscrimination principle of Article 2.3 of the SPS
Agreement by discriminating against foreign imports. Part II also argues that Title III violates Article 5 of the
SPS Agreement because it is a trade restrictive regulation that is not based on a supportive risk assessment.
Finally, Part II asserts that, because Title III exempts a large number of direct-to-consumer food sources from
its administration, its overall ability to provide bioterrorism protection is significantly diminished. This
presents the question: if Title III fails to achieve its stated purpose, can it ever comply with the risk assessment
principle of the Agreement?
Part III concludes that Title III of the Bioterrorism Act violates two key provisions of the SPS Agreement.
Because the Bioterrorism Act as written specifically requires the trade-restrictive measures in question, Title
III should be rejected in its entirety to remain consistent with U.S. trade obligations under the WTO. This Part
then evaluates the implications of Title III’s breach of the SPS Agreement. If the United States retains the
measure, it risks an adverse decision from the dispute settlement system of the WTO. In closing, Part III
recommends that the United States collaborate with international trading partners in the future to achieve a
global bioterrorism solution that is sensitive to trade considerations.
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INTRODUCTION 
Emmentaler Exports is a food facility located in Bern, Switzerland 
that processes and packages a variety of Swiss cheeses for export to 
the United States.  Gourmet Gouda, a domestic food facility located 
in Peoria, Illinois, similarly produces gourmet cheeses for the U.S. 
market and competes head-to-head with Emmentaler Exports.1  In 
2002, however, Gourmet Gouda gained a considerable competitive 
advantage over its rival, Emmentaler Exports, when the United States 
passed the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002 (“Bioterrorism Act”).2  Designed to prevent and 
                                                          
 1. Emmentaler Exports and Gourmet Gouda are fictitious companies used to 
illustrate the adverse trade effect of the recent U.S. legislation that is the subject of 
this Comment. 
 2. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 7 U.S.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A., 21 U.S.C.A., and 42 U.S.C.A. (West 2006)). The Act 
amends parts of three existing legislative protections:  the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000), the Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 210 
(2000), and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).  Section 511 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act makes the movement and sale of biological agents a criminal offense.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 262 (2000).  The Bioterrorism Act was passed largely in response to the 2001 
anthrax attacks, where letters laced with anthrax sent to news media offices and 
Senators on Capitol Hill infected twenty-two people.  See David P. Fidler, Bioterrorism, 
Public Health, and International Law, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 7, 7 (2002) (illustrating how the 
“full-blown nightmare” of the anthrax attacks made bioterrorism in the United States 
“a terrifying reality”); James G. Hodge, Bioterrorism Law and Policy:  Critical Choices in 
Public Health, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 254, 255 (2002) (describing how the anthrax 
attacks fueled fears of future bioterrorism attacks among both government officials 
and the public at large). 
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respond to the threat of bioterrorism,3 Title III of the Bioterrorism 
Act—Protecting Safety and Security of Food and Drug Supply4—
requires Emmentaler Exports, along with all foreign food facilities, to 
designate a U.S. agent5 and to provide prior notice of every shipment 
imported into the United States,6 at an annual cost of $425 million 
per facility.7  Meanwhile, Gourmet Gouda and other domestic food 
facilities continue to access the U.S. market at no additional expense.8  
The example of these hypothetical companies demonstrates the 
burdensome impact this legislation has on foreign imports. 
With measures to streamline and enhance federal response,9 
tighten control over existing biological agents in the United States,10 
                                                          
 3. See pmbl., 116 Stat. at 594 (stating that the purpose of the Bioterrorism Act is 
“[t]o improve the ability of the United States to prevent, prepare for, and respond to 
bioterrorism and other public health emergencies”).  Bioterrorism is the use of 
biological, infectious agents to cause death or suffering in humans or other 
organisms, presumably for an ideological or political purpose.  See Hodge, supra note 
2, at 254 (defining bioterrorism as “the intentional use of an infectious agent . . . to 
cause death or disease in humans or other organisms in order to negatively influence 
the conduct of government or intimidate a population”); see also Lisa Lovett, Food For 
Thought:  Consistent Protocol Could Strengthen Food Supply Security Measures, 10 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 465, 475 (2004) (describing food bioterrorism as the act of 
“tampering with any link in the food supply chain to intentionally harm consumers 
for presumably political purposes”). 
 4. §§ 301-336, 116 Stat. at 662-81 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 
21 U.S.C.A. (West 2006)).  As the relevant trade agreement does not address 
pharmaceutical or drug regulation, this Comment focuses solely on the food 
provisions of Title III, found in Subtitle A.  See also infra note 21 (limiting further this 
Comment’s focus to those portions of the trade agreement relating to sanitary (food) 
measures).  
 5. 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d (West 2006) (requiring domestic and foreign food 
facilities producing food for consumption in the United States to register with the 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and additionally requiring foreign food 
facilities to include in their registration the name of a designated U.S. agent to serve 
as a communications link in both routine and emergency situations between the 
facility and FDA). 
 6. § 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 381 (West 2006) (compelling foreign food exporters 
seeking access to the U.S. market to further provide advance notice of all food 
shipments before their arrival at a U.S. port). 
 7. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 70 Fed. Reg. 57,505, 57,507 
(Oct. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (estimating the total annual costs 
of hiring and retaining a U.S. agent at $164,500,000); Prior Notice of Imported Food 
Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974, 59,062, tbl.47 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule) (calculating the total annual cost to foreign facilities of 
providing prior notice to the United States at $260,633,000).  Thus, foreign facilities 
required to comply with the new provisions of Title III of the Bioterrorism Act will 
spend a total of $425,163,000 annually to gain access to the U.S. market. 
 8. See supra notes 5-6 (describing how the requirements and associated costs of 
registration and prior notice apply only to foreign food facilities). 
 9. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300hh-11 (West 2006) (creating a new Assistant Secretary 
for Public Health and Emergency Preparedness to act as central command). 
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and protect the nation’s food, drug, and water supply,11 the 
Bioterrorism Act is declared to be the “first line of defense against 
bioterrorism.”12  Despite a general recognition that greater 
bioterrorism protection is needed,13 members of the international 
trade community have raised concerns about the trade-restrictive 
                                                          
 10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300hh-11 (West 2003); § 201-31, 116 Stat. at 637-62 (codified as 
amended at scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A., and 42 U.S.C.A. (West 
2006)).  
 11. See §§ 301-336, 116 Stat. at 662-81 (codified as amended at scattered sections 
of 21 U.S.C.A. (West 2006)); §§ 401-403, 116 Stat. at 682-87 (codified as amended at 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. (West 2006)); see also Cindy Skrzycki, A Heaping 
Helping of Food Security, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2003, at E01 (reporting on the FDA’s 
intent for the Bioterrorism Act to enhance food security without unnecessarily 
burdening the food industry or the Agency, but describing the Act as so sweepingly 
broad that lobster catchers in Maine will probably have to register with the FDA). 
 12. Ryan R. Kemper, Responding to Bioterrorism:  An Analysis of Title I and II of the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 83 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 385, 403 (2005).  Kemper assesses the historical problems of bioterrorism, the 
2001 anthrax attacks, and future bioterrorist threats, examines the roles of the 
various federal agencies responsible for components of bioterrorism prevention or 
response, and then proceeds to analyze the recent bioterrorism legislation. 
 13. See, e.g., Yonah Alexander, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century:  Threats and 
Responses, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 59, 91 (2000) (identifying a need for greater tools, 
resources, and inter-agency cooperation to manage the consequences of 
bioterrorism); David Johnston, Report Calls U.S. Agencies Understaffed for Bioterror, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 6, 2003, § 1, at 9 (citing a new report that calls federal agencies 
underprepared for a bioterrorism attack and predicts agencies would likely be 
overwhelmed by an attack, particularly due to a lack of sufficient medical and 
scientific personnel in agency ranks); Research!America, 2001 Public Opinion Poll 
on Bioterrorism & Research, Nov. 6, 2001, http://www.researchamerica.org/poll 
data/2001/bioterrorism2001.pdf (polling Americans directly after the anthrax 
attacks and reporting that fifty-five percent of Americans were concerned with the 
future threat of bioterrorism); Trust for America’s Health, Poll on America’s Top 
Health Concerns and Emergency Preparedness from Trust for America’s Health, 
Feb. 2005, http://healthyamericans.org/reports/budget05/PollingMemo.pdf 
(confirming with recent poll data that Americans continue to believe the United 
States is unprepared for a terrorist attack on the food supply).  Experts disagree over 
the probability of a bioterrorist occurrence.  Compare  Prior Notice of Imported Food 
Under the Public Health Security Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,064 (Oct. 10, 2003) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (indicating that historical evidence suggests an 
“intentional strike on the food supply is a low-probability . . . event”), with John G. 
Bartlett, MD, Update in Infectious Diseases, 131 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 273, 277-78 
(Aug. 17, 1999), available at http://www.annals.org/cgi/reprint/131/4/273.pdf 
(estimating a real risk from bioterrorism, as at least ten and possibly as many as 
seventeen nations possess agents of biological warfare) and Center for Disease 
Control, Bioterrorism Overview, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/bioterrorism/overview.asp 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2006) (reporting that biological agents are an attractive option 
for terrorists).  However, most experts do agree that a successful attack would be 
devastating to American life, health, and the economy.  See RISK ASSESSMENT FOR 
FOOD TERRORISM AND OTHER FOOD SAFETY CONCERNS pt. II.B.2, ¶ 2 (2003)  
(hereinafter “FDA RISK ASSESSMENT”), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/rabtact.html 
(identifying the consequences of a bioterror attack as illnesses and death, social and 
political implications, and economic effects, especially as “one out of every eight 
Americans is estimated to work in an occupation directly linked to food 
production”); Minnesota Dept. of Health, Bioterrorism:  Questions and Answers 
(2001), http://www.health.state.mn.us/bioterrorism/bioterqa.pdf (cautioning that 
bioterrorism is a “high consequence risk”). 
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portions of the Act,14 mainly Title III.15  Title III discriminates between 
domestic and foreign food manufacturers by imposing increased 
transaction costs and procedural burdens solely on foreign facilities.16  
As a consequence, Title III constitutes a barrier to trade likely to drive 
foreign food manufacturers out of the U.S. market.17 
                                                          
 14. The Bioterrorism Act in general has elicited concerns and criticism.  See, e.g., 
Kemper, supra note 12, at 413-15 (analyzing Titles I and II of the Act and concluding 
that, although the Act helped to strengthen bioterrorism response mechanisms, 
further improvement is needed to consolidate the actions of the numerous federal 
agencies and improve coordination); Lovett, supra note 3, at 476-87 (criticizing the 
food provisions of the Act, including Title II (governing the regulation of milk and 
dairy products subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Agriculture) and 
Title III (governing general food products and imports regulation by FDA) as 
inefficient and likely unenforceable).  See generally Lori. L. Buchsbaum, The U.S. 
Public Health Response to Bioterrorism:  Need for a Stronger Legislative Approach, 7 J. MED. & 
L. 1, 25-29 (2003) (reviewing major pieces of legislation that address public health 
emergencies and critiquing the Bioterrorism Act). 
 15. See, e.g., Gary G. Yerkey, Protectionist Pressures in U.S. Forcing Bush to Ignore WTO 
Obligations, EC Says, 21 INT’L TRADE REP. 19, 19 (2004) (discussing the contents of the 
annual European Commission report on U.S. tariff and non-tariff barriers and citing 
a “growing concern in Europe” that new U.S. measures to counter bioterrorism have 
“unnecessarily trade-distorting effects”); Preliminary Comments of the European 
Commission on the Bioterrorism Act, Aug. 30, 2002, http://ec.europa.eu/food/ 
international/trade/us_bio_act_prel_com_en.pdf (voicing initial concerns of the 
Commission, the body which represents the European Union, that the Bioterrorism 
Act is a major administrative and economic burden that creates a serious barrier to 
trade in a memo to the FDA).  Among additional comments on the new legislation 
received by the FDA from domestic and foreign trade representative groups, nearly 
thirty embassies submitted their concerns that Title III negatively impacts trade 
relations. See FDA Dockets Management, http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ 
default.htm (providing a searchable database of the comments received by the FDA, 
and filed and published by Dockets Management).  Criticism of Title III’s adverse 
trade effect is not limited merely to foreign entities.  See Rossella Brevetti, Association 
Representing Millers Warns FDA Bioterrorism Proposal Would Hurt Trade, 20 INT’L TRADE 
REP. 666, 666-67 (2003) (reporting that the North American Millers Association 
(“NAMA”), which represents the milling industry on the entire North American 
continent, has published concerns that the FDA’s proposed implementation of prior 
notice is executed “in the most restrictive and commerce-restricting manner 
possible”); Christopher S. Rugaber, Food Importers to Seek Flexibility in Proposed FDA 
Prior Notice Regulation, 20 INT’L TRADE REP. 254, 254 (2003) (mentioning concerns of 
the Grocery Manufacturers of America, a trade association, about the prior notice 
regulation); Benjamin Onyango & Calum G. Turvey, Impact of the 2002 Bioterrorism Act 
on the New Jersey Food Industry (Food Policy Inst., Rutgers Univ., Working Paper No. 
WP-0603-010, 2003), available at http://www.foodpolicyinstitute.org/docs/bio 
terrorism/impactofbioterrorismactNJfoodindustry.pdf (voicing domestic industry 
fears that, as a result of the Bioterrorism Act’s general restrictions, fewer foreign 
imports are likely and domestic business will suffer). 
 16. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 350d, 381 (West 2006) (imposing two new regulations 
only upon foreign entities, which discriminates against foreign food suppliers and 
favors the domestic food industry); see also infra notes 120-125 (describing the 
disparate costs imposed on foreign facilities as a result of Title III regulation). 
 17. Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,897 
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (lodging the 
complaint that “the proposed regulation is burdensome, costly, discriminatory, and 
will have a negative impact on foreign trade”). 
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This Comment takes up the cries of the international trade 
community, analyzing Title III under the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”)18 Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS 
Agreement”).19  The SPS Agreement recognizes the right of WTO 
member countries20 to enact measures to protect against food-borne 
risks,21 such as biological contamination, but seeks to ensure that such 
measures do not unduly restrict trade.22  Title III violates this trade 
agreement because it discriminates against foreign food suppliers, 
thus restricting international trade, and is maintained without 
support from a risk assessment, as is required.23  
Part I examines in detail the two conflicting laws that are the basis 
of this Comment—Title III of the Bioterrorism Act and the SPS 
                                                          
 18. The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was formed in 1995 as the successor 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and is an international organization 
that operates as a multilateral trading system for countries worldwide.  The main goal 
of the WTO is to facilitate free trade on a global level, which it accomplishes, in part, 
by administering and negotiating trade agreements.  See generally BHAGIRATH LAL DAS, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WTO AGREEMENT (1998) (presenting additional 
information on the WTO and discussing the major WTO Agreements, basic trade 
rules, and various administrative components of the system). 
 19. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, April 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1A, Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (1994) 
[hereinafter SPS Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal 
_e/15-sps.pdf. 
 20. See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO:  The Organization 
(2005), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (listing 
all 149 WTO members as of Dec. 2005).  By its membership in the WTO, the United 
States has pledged to abide by all WTO trade agreements, including the SPS 
Agreement.  
 21. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 2.1 (declaring the right of members to 
take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of human, 
animal, or plant life).  Because Title III of the Bioterrorism Act does not regulate 
plant or animal life or associated imports, this Comment focuses on the aspects of 
the SPS Agreement governing measures intended to protect human life or health.   
 22. See id. art. 2.3 (admonishing that sanitary measures enacted by member 
countries shall not be applied as disguised restrictions on trade in the form of 
discrimination between domestic and foreign industry); see also Nick Covelli & Viktor 
Hohots, The Health Regulation of Biotech Foods Under the WTO Agreements, 6 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 773, 777-78 (2003) (echoing that the Agreement’s purpose is to govern 
sanitary measures and to limit the possibility that such measures are used as an 
excuse to restrict trade).  See generally Kevin C. Kennedy, Resolving International 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Disputes in the WTO:  Lessons and Future Directions, 55 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 81 (2000) (reviewing the major provisions of the SPS Agreement and three 
of the four cases disputed in the WTO system under the Agreement, and suggesting 
possible future reforms to clarify and expand the application of the SPS Agreement).  
The fourth case disputed under the SPS Agreement was decided after the previous 
article’s publication.  See generally Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Japan-Apples]. 
 23. SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5.1 (requiring all members to produce or 
obtain supportive risk assessments upon which sanitary measures should be based); 
see infra Part II.B (concluding that Title III violates two key principles of the SPS 
Agreement—the prohibition on discrimination and the requirement that members 
obtain risk assessments in support of enacted sanitary measures). 
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Agreement—focusing on those portions of Title III that adversely 
impact international trade.24  Part I also presents the WTO case EC 
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),25 the first food 
regulation case disputed in the WTO system for a violation of the SPS 
Agreement.26  This case clarified the two major principles of the SPS 
Agreement that are explored in this Comment: the prohibition on 
discrimination and the obligation to support trade–restrictive 
measures with an analytical risk assessment.27  As such, it will be used 
as a tool to explain these principles and illustrate how a WTO 
member could successfully dispute Title III’s compliance with the SPS 
Agreement. 
Part II of this Comment analyzes Title III’s conformity with the SPS 
Agreement.  This Part establishes that Title III is subject to the SPS 
Agreement because it is a sanitary measure designed to protect 
human life and health from the threat of deliberate food 
contamination.  Part II then argues that, while motivated by the real 
threat of bioterrorism,28 Title III nonetheless violates the non-
discrimination principle of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement by 
discriminating against foreign imports.  Part II also argues that Title 
                                                          
 24. See infra Part I.A (describing in detail the requirements imposed by the 
registration and prior notice provisions of Title III on food facilities); see also Peter 
Menyasz, Newfoundland Raises Trade Concerns About Proposed U.S. Bioterrorism 
Regulations, 20 INT’L TRADE REP. 647, 647 (2003) (describing the Newfoundland 
government’s efforts to appeal to the U.S. government about the new bioterrorism 
legislation, particularly the prior notice provisions and their resulting impact on 
Newfoundland’s substantial seafood exports to the United States); Daniel Pruzin, 
U.S. Trading Partners Concerning with Rules for Food Registration Under Bioterrorism Act, 20 
INT’L TRADE REP. 1158, 1158 (2003) (expressing concerns from WTO members such 
as the European Union, China, and Mexico, among others, that the registration 
requirements are more trade-restrictive than necessary). 
 25. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC-
Hormones]. 
 26. Id. ¶¶ 253-255 (setting out the findings and conclusions of the Appellate 
Body and concluding that Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement was violated).  See 
generally Dale E. McNiel, The First Case Under the WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Agreement:  The European Union’s Hormone Ban, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 89, 93 (1999) 
(conducting a thorough analysis of the initial dispute between the European Union 
and the United States under the SPS Agreement). 
 27. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 210-246 (assessing the argument that the 
European Community (“EC”) violated Articles 5.5 and 2.3 of the SPS Agreement, 
which prohibit discrimination); id. ¶¶ 178-209 (addressing the claim that the EC also 
violated Article 5.1 by maintaining a sanitary measure without adequate support from 
a risk assessment). 
 28. See Challenges Before Indian Food Exporters, THE HINDU, Nov. 3, 2003, http:// 
www.hindu.com/biz/2003/11/03/stories/2003110300040200.htm (opining, in an 
article of the online edition of India’s national newspaper, that the Bioterrorism Act 
was “clearly intended to prevent the possibility of” a bioterror attack “using the food 
chain,” and disputing the argument that the Bioterrorism Act was motivated by 
protectionist pressures). 
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III violates Article 5 of the SPS Agreement because it is a trade 
restrictive regulation that is not based on a supportive risk 
assessment.  Finally, Part II asserts that, because Title III exempts a 
large number of direct-to-consumer food sources from its 
administration, its overall ability to provide bioterrorism protection is 
significantly diminished.29  This presents the question: if Title III fails 
to achieve its stated purpose, can it ever comply with the risk 
assessment principle of the Agreement? 
Part III concludes that Title III of the Bioterrorism Act violates two 
key provisions of the SPS Agreement.  Because the Bioterrorism Act 
as written specifically requires the trade-restrictive measures in 
question, Title III should be rejected in its entirety to remain 
consistent with U.S. trade obligations under the WTO.30  This Part 
then evaluates the implications of Title III’s breach of the SPS 
Agreement.  If the United States retains the measure, it risks an 
adverse decision from the dispute settlement system of the WTO.31  In 
closing, Part III recommends that the United States collaborate with 
international trading partners in the future to achieve a global 
bioterrorism solution that is sensitive to trade considerations.32 
I.  THE ELEMENTS OF A TRADE DISPUTE: TITLE III OF THE 
BIOTERRORISM ACT AND THE BASIC OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE WTO 
AGREEMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY 
MEASURES 
The most basic principle of international trade is that goods and 
services from exporting countries should enjoy virtually free access 
                                                          
 29. See infra Part II.B.2.c (highlighting that registration exempts both restaurants 
and retail establishments from its requirements and arguing that these exemptions 
create gaping holes in Title III’s bioterrorism protection, through which bioterrorists 
can easily slip). 
 30. See infra notes 244-245 (describing how the letter of the Bioterrorism Act 
imposes measures that act as barriers to trade and constrains the FDA’s ability to 
lessen its trade-restrictive effects); see also Peter A. Quinter, Scrap the Bioterrorism Act, 
JOURNAL OF COMMERCE 44, Feb. 15, 2004, available at http://www.becker-poliakoff. 
com/attorneys/bios/quinter_p.html (click on “Scrap the Bioterrorism Act” 
hyperlink under “Articles”) (highlighting numerous problems with the Bioterrorism 
Act, including the fact that over seventy-five percent of companies failed to register 
by the required deadline of December 12, 2003, and describing the Act as “an affront 
to foreign countries” that “will not significantly increase the security of the U.S. food 
supply”). 
 31. See infra note 90 and accompanying text (describing the quasi-judicial dispute 
settlement mechanism employed by the WTO to resolve trade disputes between 
WTO members). 
 32. See infra notes 253-254 (suggesting ways in which the United States can join 
efforts to form international, cooperative bioterrorism prevention proposals already 
underway). 
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into an importing country.33  Tariffs, however, are an age-old 
mechanism used to protect domestic production from foreign 
competition by taxing imported goods.34  Non-tariff barriers also 
exist, which have the same effect of a tariff, but are not in the easily 
recognizable form of a tax.35  Food regulation has become an 
increasingly visible issue in trade disputes, as health and safety rules 
often disguise an underlying intent to favor domestic industry.36 
Title III of the Bioterrorism Act acts as a non-tariff barrier and 
restricts food imports by imposing increased transaction costs and 
procedural burdens on foreign food exporters trading with the 
United States.37  As such, it directly conflicts with the objective of the 
WTO Agreements, and the SPS Agreement in particular, to reduce 
tariffs and non-tariff regulatory actions that impede free trade. 
A.  Title III: Protecting the Safety and Security of the U.S. Food Supply 
In an effort to protect the food supply and prepare the nation for 
the possibility of a bioterrorist attack, Title III regulations augment 
the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”)38 authority over food 
                                                          
 33. LAL DAS, supra note 18, at 1. 
 34. Id. at 19-27 (classifying and defining various types of tariffs). 
 35. See TIM JOSLING ET AL., INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, FOOD 
REGULATION AND TRADE:  TOWARD A SAFE AND OPEN GLOBAL SYSTEM 1, 16-21, tbl.2.1 
(2004) (categorizing various types of food regulations that may act as non-tariff 
barriers to trade); see also David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of 
the World Trade Organization:  An Assessment after Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
865, 865 (2000) (illustrating that, although one success of the WTO trading system 
has been a sharp reduction in tariffs, many “governments have kept protectionism in 
place by simply shifting from tariff to non-tariff measures” to offer domestic industry 
protection from foreign competition). 
 36. See generally JOSLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 16 (describing a number of 
different factors that contribute to the growing dispute over food regulation).  
Because both the observable risk of a given measure and availability of information 
about potential risks may differ among nations, the benefits of a given regulation 
may exceed its costs in one nation, but not another.  See id. at 29 (displaying a 
graphical analysis of “regulatory underprotection and overprotection”).  Also, the 
general provision of farm support and protection policies, especially in wealthier 
nations, infuses politics into the already complicated system of regulation and can 
discourage developing nations from trade on a larger scale.  See id. at 3-7 (conveying 
the international impact from the recent “globalization of the food system”). 
 37. See infra notes 117-124 and accompanying text (demonstrating the title’s 
negative effect on foreign trade as a result of its restrictions on food imports); see also 
Sean D. Murphy, Bioterrorism Act’s Notice Requirements for Food Imports, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 
837, 838 (2004) (calling the Bioterrorism Act’s prior notice provision a non-tariff 
barrier to trade). 
 38. As the FDA is the federal agency in charge of the majority of food regulation 
in the United States, its leadership in this area was a natural choice.  Meat and dairy 
products, regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture, are not 
included under the auspices of Title III, but are touched upon elsewhere.  See Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 7 U.S.C.A. 
§ 8401 (West 2006); see also FDA Registration of Food Facilities, 21 C.F.R. § 1.226(g) 
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imports and enforce specific conditions on food manufacturers.39  
The FDA is charged with implementing Title III and has proceeded 
to do so through its normal process of rulemaking.40  Of Title III’s 
various provisions, section 305, Registration of Food Facilities 
(“Registration”),41 and section 307, Prior Notice of Imported Foods 
(“Prior Notice”),42 are of great concern to the international trade 
community because they each impose burdens solely on foreign 
facilities. 
                                                          
(2006) (exempting facilities regulated by the Department of Agriculture from 
registration requirements). 
 39. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 334, 381 (West 2006) (expanding the FDA’s 
administrative authority over food imports to prevent the spread of contaminated 
food articles); 21 U.S.C.A. § 350c (West 2006) (requiring domestic food facilities to 
maintain records of sales transactions and providing the FDA with the authority to 
inspect such records as needed). 
 40. See FDA Bioterrorism Act Homepage, http://www.fda.gov/oc/bioterrorism/ 
bioact.html (providing a link to all FDA actions on the Bioterrorism Act generally, 
Title III specifically, and a summary document titled “FDA Actions on Bioterrorism 
Legislation”).  See generally KENNETH R. PIÑA & WAYNE L. PINES, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 
INSTITUTE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 
(1998)(giving an overview of food and drug law and explaining the FDA regulatory 
process governing food and drug products).  Under the authority provided in Title 
III, the FDA has issued both an interim rule and a final rule with respect to 
registration.  See Registration of Food Facilities, 21 C.F.R. §§ 1.225-1.243 (codifying 
the FDA regulations); Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 70 Fed. Reg. 
57,505 (Oct. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (announcing the 
affirmation of the interim rule [Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 58,894 (Oct. 10, 2003) (interim rule)] and noting that the final rule does not 
make any changes to those regulatory requirements established in the interim final 
rule).  For prior notice, the FDA has issued only an interim final rule; however, given 
the lack of substantive change between the interim and final version of the 
registration regulation, this likely constitutes the FDA’s final determination of how to 
implement the prior notice requirements.  See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under 
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 
68 Fed. Reg. 58,974 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule); 
see also Joint FDA-CBP Plan for Increasing Integration and Assessing the 
Coordination of Prior Notice Timeframes, http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~pn/pnplan2 
.html (specifying three ways in which the FDA and CBP are partnering on prior 
notice requirements, and announcing the FDA’s intention to publish a final rule on 
prior notice by June 2005, which has not yet been realized).  The majority of 
references herein will be to the interim rules, with the understanding that for prior 
notice the interim rule is, in fact, the binding regulation. 
 41. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d (West 2006) (amending Chapter IV of the Federal 
Food Drug & Cosmetic Act by adding a new section, section 415, to the end of the 
existing text); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 1.225-1.243 (implementing section 305 of Title 
III). 
 42. See  21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 381 (West 2006) (amending section 801 of the 
Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act by adding a new section, section 801(m)(1), at 
the end of the existing text); see also FDA Prior Notice of Imported Food, 21 C.F.R. 
§§ 1.276-1.282 (2006) (implementing section 307 of Title III). 
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Section 305, Registration, requires domestic and foreign facilities 
that supply food for consumption in the United States43 to register 
the name and address of the facility, all applicable trade names under 
which the facility or parent company operates, and the general food 
category of the product with the FDA.44  Registration is designed to 
deter bioterrorism by providing a disincentive against intentional 
contamination,45 and to respond to potential threats by facilitating 
rapid agency response.46  Accordingly, non-compliance with 
registration is a prohibited act and any imports from foreign facilities 
                                                          
 43. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d(a)(1) (West 2006) (defining the types of facilities that 
must register under the Bioterrorism Act as any facility “engaged in manufacturing, 
processing, packing, or holding food for consumption in the United States”).  But see 
id. § 350d(b)(1) (exempting farms, restaurants, other retail food establishments, 
nonprofit food establishments in which food is prepared for or served directly to the 
consumer, and fishing vessels from Title III requirements); see also id. 
§ 350d(b)(3)(B) (providing that if a foreign facility exports to another facility for 
further processing or packaging, the former facility is not required to register, but 
the latter is unless the subsequent processing is of a de minimis nature, such as 
labeling); id. § 350d(b)(3)(A) (requiring storage facilities to register, but exempting 
companies that merely trans-ship food products through the United States, intended 
for a final destination outside U.S. borders). 
 44. See id. § 350d(a)(1) (listing the various registration requirements); id. 
§ 350d(a)(2) (pronouncing that the general food category should be included in 
registration, if determined to be necessary by the FDA through guidance); see also 
Guidance for Industry on Necessity of the Use of Food Product Categories in 
Registration of Food Facilities, 68 Fed. Reg. 42,415 (July 17, 2003) (concluding that 
information about food product categories is necessary for an effective response to 
food-related emergencies).  Other contact information is also required under the 
FDA rules implementing the registration section.  See 21 C.F.R. § 1.232(a)-(b), (e) 
(codifying the FDA regulations that add to the Title III requirements); Registration 
of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 
and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5,378 (proposed Feb. 3, 2003) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposing to add to the Bioterrorism Act the 
requirement that registration contain:  the name of the parent company that owns 
the facility, if applicable, the phone number of the facility, and an emergency 
contact); cf. Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,922 
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (justifying, in the 
response to comment 116, the FDA requirements that exceed those imposed by the 
legislative act). 
 45. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,951-52 
(summarizing the benefits of the new registration provision and explaining that the 
added capability to trace incidents of contamination may deter individuals from 
intentionally contaminating the food supply, for fear of subsequent discovery and 
apprehension). 
 46. See id. (announcing additionally that the increased traceability under 
registration will enable the FDA to quickly track the roots of any incident of 
contamination and proceed accordingly to contain any outbreak).  The Agency 
further believes that maintaining emergency contact information for domestic and 
foreign facilities will permit more timely communication with the FDA to occur and, 
consequently, allow both the Agency and the facility to respond effectively to limit 
the effects of a possible contamination.  See also infra note 50 and accompanying text 
(clarifying that the role of the U.S. agent, required for foreign facilities, is to serve as 
a communications link with the FDA in both emergency and routine situations). 
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that are not properly registered will be detained and barred entry 
into the United States.47 
Foreign facilities that import FDA-regulated food products are 
additionally required to designate a U.S. agent in their registration 
with the FDA.48  The FDA has issued only two requirements with 
respect to the responsibility, liability, and overall role of the U.S. 
agent: the agent must reside or maintain a place of business within 
the United States and must be physically present in the United 
States.49  The agent’s sole responsibility is to act as a communications 
link between the FDA and the facility in order to convey information 
in both routine and emergency situations.50 
In addition to the registration requirements, foreign facilities 
exporting food products into the United States must comply with 
section 307, Prior Notice, and submit advance notice of all imports in 
                                                          
 47. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 331(dd) (West 2006) (making the failure to register in 
accordance with Title III a prohibited act under the existing Federal Food Drug and 
Cosmetic Act); 21 U.S.C.A. § 381(c) (subjecting the food product of a foreign facility 
that fails to register to immediate detainment until proper registration is received by 
the FDA); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1.241(a) (explaining that, because failure to comply 
with registration is a prohibited act under 21 U.S.C. § 331, both civil and criminal 
penalties may apply); id. § 1.241(b) (providing that if a facility fails to update its 
registration—for example, to reflect a change in ownership—the FDA may 
consequently cancel the registration); id. § 1.241(c) (giving the FDA authority to 
seize and detain any food shipments from foreign food facilities that have not 
properly registered). 
 48. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d(a)(1)(B); 21 C.F.R. § 1.232(d) (calling for the name, 
address and phone number of the U.S. agent to be included in the registration of 
any foreign food facility). 
 49. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.227(b)(13) (defining a “U.S. agent” and reiterating the two, 
seemingly similar requirements, that the person designated as “agent” maintain a 
physical address within the United States and be physically present at that address 
within the United States); see also id. § 1.227(b)(13)(i)-(ii) (defining the 
communication role of the agent and explaining that the FDA will, for all intents and 
purposes, treat representations made by the agent as representations of the foreign 
facility); Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,915 
(describing, in the response to comment 84, the duties of the U.S. agent and 
clarifying the limited liability protection afforded to agents unless the agent 
knowingly submits false information to the FDA or the foreign facility and the agent 
are essentially the same entity). 
 50. Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,915. 
(describing, in the response to comment 85, the agent’s communications role and 
providing the opportunity for facilities to designate an alternative emergency 
contact).  Before publishing its final rule on registration, the FDA allowed comment 
on just two issues—the cost to foreign facilities of hiring and retaining a U.S. agent 
and the effect on domestic business if some foreign facilities cease export due to the 
new agent requirement—illustrating the controversy surrounding this particular 
provision.  See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 70 Fed. Reg. 57,505, 57,506 
(Oct. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (explaining that although the 
FDA received over 200 comments on the interim rule, it rejected those outside the 
set scope). 
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order to gain access to the U.S. market.51  Prior notice must be 
submitted electronically52 and must include, inter alia, a description 
of the food article, the identity of the manufacturer, shipper, and 
grower of the article, the country from which the article originates, 
and the anticipated port of entry.53  Congress gave the FDA discretion 
to determine the length of time necessary to receive, review, and 
respond sufficiently to prior notification submissions.54  Accordingly, 
the FDA established the following scheme for food articles: prior 
notice must be received a minimum of two hours before arriving by 
vehicle, four hours before arriving by train or air, and eight hours 
before arriving by sea vessel.55 
After prior notice has been received and accepted, the FDA will not 
allow modifications without restarting the clock.56  This means that if, 
for example, a facility needs to update its prior notice submissions to 
reflect a change in the anticipated port of entry due to weather 
conditions, it must submit the modified prior notice anew, either two, 
four, or eight hours before arrival, depending on the mode of 
                                                          
 51. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 381 (West 2006); FDA Prior Notice of Imported Food, 21 
C.F.R. § 1.277(a) (2006) (applying the regulation to all food, for humans or animals, 
that is imported or offered for import, with the exception of those items exempted 
in subsection (b)). 
 52. Compare 21 C.F.R. § 1.231(a)-(c) (permitting electronic registration, 
registration by fax or mail, and CD-ROM submissions for multiple registrations), with 
21 C.F.R. § 1.280 (requiring prior notice to be submitted electronically, in English, 
through either the U.S. Custom and Border Protection (“CBP”) Automated Broker 
Interface (“ABI/ACS”) or the newly created FDA PIN System Interface).  Prior notice 
submissions are allowed by email or fax, but only if one or both electronic systems 
are temporarily malfunctioning.  21 C.F.R. § 1.280(c)-(d).  Thus, some facilities will 
be forced to update their technological capabilities specifically to comply with prior 
notice. 
 53. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.281; Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 
58,974, 58,978 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule) 
(listing the information that must be included in a prior notice submission); see also 
id. at 58,980 (comparing, in Table 1A, the information that must be submitted as 
prior notice for each specific mode of transportation). 
 54. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 381 (West 2006) (capping the FDA’s response time at five 
days, but otherwise affording the FDA great latitude). 
 55. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.279; Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
59,044 (setting forth the required time frame for Prior Notice submissions under 
option six, which was selected from twelve options considered in the FDA interim 
final rule ); see id. at 59,045-46 (displaying estimated costs for option six, in Tables 23-
25, including loss in value resulting from prior notice that must be resubmitted; 
learning, coordination, and technology costs; and the cost of actual employee time to 
fill out and submit the prior notice information). 
 56. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.282(a)(2) (explaining the procedure for resubmissions of 
prior notice, which must be completed each time information changes after the FDA 
has confirmed receipt of prior notice, and reiterating the fact that resubmissions 
must be received under the same time frames as an original prior notice 
submission). 
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transportation.  The FDA believes that the time frames adopted in 
the interim rule57 reduce the need for amended submissions and that 
its strict stance on modifications is therefore warranted.58  Still, some 
facilities will inevitably experience unexpected change mid-shipment 
and the FDA’s modification policy may prevent these facilities from 
meeting originally scheduled arrival times or subsequent deadlines. 
The purpose of prior notice is to provide more precise information 
about what food products are being imported into the United States 
and to enable the FDA to respond to specific bioterrorism threats 
and prevent the dissemination of contaminated foods.59  As a result, 
any food offered for import without proper prior notice will be 
                                                          
 57. The FDA initially proposed that notice be received by noon on the calendar 
day before the food product arrived for import but, after multiple adverse comments 
were received, the FDA settled on a shorter time frame (option six) in the interim 
rule.  See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5,428, 5,429 
(proposed Feb. 3, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposing the above-
described rule); see also Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health 
Security Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,025 (listing the twelve regulatory options 
considered by the FDA, assessing the costs associated with each option, and settling 
finally on option six).  Many of the concerned comments dealt with trade between 
the United States and its neighbors.  See, e.g., FASonline Summary, United States– 
Canada Consultative Committee on Agriculture (Nov. 19, 2004), http://www. 
fas.usda.gov/itp/canada/CCA-11-19-04.asp (noting Canadian concerns that the prior 
notice rule will result in prohibitive costs for businesses and suggesting an alternative 
model for goods shipped via truck); Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc. 
(“GMA”), Comment on Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002; Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, Apr. 4, 2003, http://www.gmabrands.com/publicpolicy/docs/ 
comment_p.cfm?DocID=1109 (commenting on the problems with the FDA’s 
proposed rule and providing a helpful illustration of how such a requirement would 
seriously impact business with Canada and Mexico).  The GMA’s comment questions 
the efficiency of the enforcement of prior notice and provides the example of a 
hypothetical Canadian facility, located one hour north of the U.S. border, required 
to delay shipment after loading a truck in order to provide the required advance 
notice (two hours) of the truck’s specific contents post-loading. Id. 
 58. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security Act of 
2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,013 (“FDA has chosen timeframes that provide it with very 
little leeway in the time it has to ‘receive, review and respond’ to the prior notice 
submissions. Thus, we concluded that we could no longer permit changes to prior 
notice without restarting the clock.”). 
 59. See id. at 59,064 (predicting that enhanced knowledge of what articles of food 
are being imported into the United States will help the FDA identify which imports 
require further inspection and which are safe for entry).  The FDA illustrates, in the 
interim rule, the benefit added by prior notice’s increased information by 
analogizing to its past experience with the potentially devastating consequences of 
unintentional food contamination.  Id. at 59,064-65.  For example, just one truckload 
of diseased cantaloupes represents roughly 1,652 servings of fruit.  Id. at 59,064.  If 
the FDA receives advance information about a similar truckload of intentionally 
contaminated melons, such as a report that an employee at a facility that ships 
melons from Mexico to the United States has ties to suspected terrorists, prior notice 
will permit the FDA to act with Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) to detain the 
appropriate imports and investigate further, thus preventing the infected 
cantaloupes from reaching unsuspecting American mouths.  Id. at 59,065. 
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refused admission into the United States.60  Additionally, if notice is 
deficient or inaccurate, the FDA may detain the food at port until 
notice is corrected to its satisfaction.61  Finally, because the FDA 
expects registration and prior notice to work together to provide 
greater protection of the domestic food supply,62 failure to register 
under section 305 is treated as a failure to provide adequate notice 
under section 307.63 
B.  The SPS Agreement: Reducing Barriers to the Free Trade of Food 
WTO member countries negotiated the SPS Agreement to reduce 
traditional food disputes, as well as regulations that more subtly 
inhibit trade,64 and to harmonize food regulation and trade 
conditions using international standards.65  As such, the Agreement 
applies broadly to any regulation that is a sanitary or phytosanitary66 
measure and has an adverse effect on international trade.67  The SPS 
                                                          
 60. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002, 21 U.S.C.A. § 381 (West 2006); 21 C.F.R. § 1.283(a)(1)(i) (stating that food 
imports that reach a U.S. port without a proper prior notice submission will be 
detained and subject to refusal of admission). 
 61. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.283(a)(1)(ii)-(iii) (specifying that imported shipments are 
also subject to refusal of admission when prior notice submissions are inaccurate or 
not received within the appropriate time frame); Prior Notice of Imported Food 
Under the Public Health Security Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,016 (describing 
that, to the extent possible, exporters submitting prior notice will be notified if the 
FDA identifies in advance a problem with the submission and the exporters will be 
allowed to correct the deficiency).  If the FDA identifies and provides notice of a 
problem, but that problem is not corrected, the food article will be subject to normal 
sanctions, including refusal.  Id. 
 62. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security Act of 
2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,985 (declaring that “[r]egistration is designed to work in 
concert with prior notice”). 
 63. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.285 (describing the interrelation between the regulations in 
Subpart I, governing prior notice submissions, and Subpart H, regulating mandatory 
registration); see also Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health 
Security Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,022 (emphasizing the importance of 
registration so that the “FDA knows who is responsible for the information in the 
prior notice and can communicate with them when necessary”). 
 64. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, at pmbl. (announcing that WTO members 
have entered into the SPS Agreement desiring to improve the human health 
situation in all member countries and to establish a “multilateral framework of rules 
and disciplines to guide the development, adoption and enforcement of sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures in order to minimize their negative effects on trade”); see also 
JOSLING ET AL., supra note 35, at 40 (asserting that the SPS Agreement was negotiated 
to reduce trade conflicts, lower transactions costs, and “make it more difficult for 
countries to shelter domestic industries” behind restrictive regulations). 
 65. See Victor, supra note 35, at 875 (stating that the SPS Agreement’s primary 
purpose is to promote trade by restricting the use of sanitary measures as trade 
barriers). 
 66. The SPS Agreement also applies to phytosanitary measures, which this 
Comment will not discuss.  See supra note 21.  
 67. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 1.1 (affirming that the Agreement 
applies to all sanitary measures negatively affecting international trade, either 
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Agreement contains five basic principles68 that countries must adhere 
to when enacting domestic sanitary measures:  scientific justification,69 
non-discrimination,70 equivalence,71 harmonization,72 and risk 
assessment.73 
One of the most basic obligations under the SPS Agreement is that 
members must ensure that all sanitary measures are applied only to 
the extent necessary74 to protect human life and health75 and are 
                                                          
directly or indirectly).  The Agreement applies to all measures enacted after January 
1, 1995 and those pre-existing measures that continue to be in force.  
 68. See Lisa K. Seilheimer, Note, The SPS Agreement Applied:  The WTO Hormone Beef 
Case, 4 ENVTL. L. 537, 548 (1998) (alternatively depicting three broad categories of 
the Agreement:  “Article 2 denotes the basic rights and obligations of Members 
under the Agreement.  Article 3 deals with the goal of establishing consistency of 
sanitary measures . . . . Article 5 imposes the obligation of risk assessment and 
discusses how Members should determine and apply appropriate sanitary 
measures”).  
 69. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 2.2 (stating that sanitary measures 
must be based on scientific principles). 
 70. See id. art. 2.3; see also id. art. 5.5 (reflecting Article 2.3 non-discrimination 
principles by instructing members to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in 
the levels of protection deemed appropriate in different situations). 
 71. See id. art. 4 (asserting that member countries must accept the sanitary 
measures of other members as equivalent). 
 72. See id. art. 3; see also id. Annex A.2 (defining harmonization as “the 
establishment, recognition and application of common sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures by different Members”). 
 73. See id. art. 5 (explaining the various risk assessment requirements and 
emphasizing the need for members to ensure that sanitary measures take into 
account relevant health risks).  It is important to note the somewhat overlapping 
application of these SPS Agreement principles.  For example, the scientific evidence 
that is required as a basis for measures under Article 2.2 can be used to support a 
deviation from harmonization with an international standard under the procedure 
outlined in Article 3.3, and must be taken into account in the assessment of risks 
under Article 5.2.  See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 187 (enumerating the factors to 
be considered in a risk assessment and focusing on both the consideration of 
scientific evidence in the form of controlled experiments and the real world risk to 
human societies); see also infra note 85 (discussing the interplay between the risk 
assessment Articles 5.1 and 5.5, and the non-discrimination Articles 2.2 and 2.3 
respectively).  Additionally, while discrimination is prohibited explicitly in Article 2.3, 
it is also incorporated in one of the specific risk assessment principles:  Article 5.5.  
See supra note 70 (noting also the relationship between the two non-discrimination 
articles); infra note 228 (describing how there is an additional connection between 
Article 5.1 and the harmonization principle of Article 3.3, so that a violation of 
Article 5.1 can trigger, in and of itself, a violation of Article 3.3). 
 74. A Dispute Panel under the GATT, the international trade agreement that was 
the precursor to the WTO Agreement, provides some basis for interpreting this term.  
See Covelli & Hohots, supra note 22, at 778 (citing Report of the Panel, Thailand—
Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7. 1990, GATT 
B.I.S.D. (37 Supp.) (1990)).  Covelli & Hohots note that under this Panel’s decision 
a sanitary measure that is not the least trade-restrictive measure available to protect 
human health will likely violate trade law.  
 75. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, arts. 2.3, 5.6 (admonishing members to 
ensure that measures enacted are not more trade restrictive than necessary to 
achieve the desired level of protection and urging members to avoid applying 
measures in a manner that would constitute a disguised barrier to trade). 
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based on scientific principles and evidence.76  Members pledge also 
not to discriminate arbitrarily or unjustifiably where similar 
conditions prevail; in other words, members cannot impose different 
conditions on different countries or set different conditions between 
domestic and foreign industry.77  Equivalence provides another 
opportunity to reduce discrimination between nations.78  If an 
exporting member objectively demonstrates that its own domestic 
measure provides an equivalent level of sanitary protection to that 
deemed appropriate by the importing member, the importing 
member must recognize and accept the equivalent measure.79 
                                                          
 76. See id. arts. 2.1, 2.2 (acknowledging that members have the right to enact 
appropriate sanitary measures in Article 2.1, but nonetheless requiring, under Article 
2.2, that members support those measures with scientific evidence); see also Kennedy, 
supra note 22, at 84 (explaining that members are free to set their own levels of 
protection, including a “zero risk” level, so long as the level of protection is 
defensible with scientific justification and Article 5 risk assessment); cf. Victor, supra 
note 35, at 872 (arguing that the scientific justification and risk assessment principles 
are the two most critical elements of the SPS Agreement).  But see SPS Agreement, 
supra note 19, art. 5.7 (permitting members to provisionally adopt sanitary measures 
on the basis of pertinent available information, as an exception to the scientific 
justification rule, when relevant scientific evidence is insufficient).  This principle, 
the so-called “precautionary principle,” has been the subject of considerable debate 
in the international community among academics, legal practitioners, and judges 
alike.  See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 123 & n.92 (discussing the principle, in the 
context of the EC’s argument that the principle should apply to its ban on 
hormones, and providing a sample of the differing views on the principle’s 
application as a rule of international law).  Significantly, for the purposes of this 
Comment, the Appellate Body found that, while the precautionary principle is 
specifically written into Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, an adjudicating body must 
apply normal principles of interpretation to examine the SPS Agreement as a whole.  
Id. ¶ 124.  Therefore, the precautionary principle does not, by itself, override the 
remaining provisions of the Agreement that are otherwise inconsistent with the 
principle, such as Article 5, which requires members to complete a risk assessment 
with relevant scientific evidence.  Id.  Thus, the United States cannot validly assert the 
precautionary principle in support of Title III or use it to rebut the argument that 
the title violates Article 5. 
 77. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 2.3 (compelling members to ensure 
that the application of sanitary measures is not applied in such a manner as to 
constitute a disguised restriction on trade); see also id. art. 5.5 (requiring, under the 
risk assessment principles, that different levels of protection be supported by a risk 
assessment, and that there be no arbitrary distinctions); Victor, supra note 35, at 882 
(noting the “curious tension” between the non-discrimination articles and the rest of 
the Agreement, which repeatedly underscores member countries’ ability to set their 
own levels of appropriate protection). 
 78. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 4. 
 79. See id. art. 4.1 (directing members to accept exporting countries’ measures 
when they are shown to provide an equivalent level of protection as the importing 
countries’ measures); id. art. 4.2 (expecting members to consult and negotiate 
among themselves an equivalent procedure or measure); see also Guidelines for the 
Development of Equivalence Agreements Regarding Food Import and Export 
Inspection and Certification Systems, CAC/GL 34-1999, available at http://www. 
codexalimentarius.net/web/standard_list.do (listing all available Codex guidelines); 
Guidelines on the Judgment of Equivalence of Sanitary Measures Associated with 
Food Inspection and Certification Systems, CAC/GL 53-2003, available at http:// 
www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/10047/CXG_053e.pdf (outlining 
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To harmonize conditions between member countries and achieve 
international consensus with respect to food standards, members are 
required to base80 newly-enacted sanitary measures on existing 
international standards.81  For food regulation, the SPS Agreement 
endorses the guidelines promulgated by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission.82  However, members may enact more stringent sanitary 
measures than the relevant international standard83 if the higher level 
of protection is justified by scientific evidence or based on a risk 
analysis.84  Independent from this requirement, all sanitary measures 
must be based on a risk assessment.85  The risk assessment must 
                                                          
the process to develop and achieve equivalence agreements for inspection and 
certification systems, to provide guidance to WTO members). 
 80. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 3.2 (asserting that a sanitary measure 
that conforms to international standards is permissible per se); see also Kennedy, 
supra note 22, at 85 (noting that the SPS Agreement, in Article 3.2, has built in an 
incentive that encourages members to comply with relevant international standards 
by establishing a “rebuttable presumption” that a measure conforming to an 
international standard is valid). 
 81. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 3.1 (recognizing that although in some 
areas of food regulation no international standards exist (an unresolved loophole in 
the application of the trade agreement) members must, nonetheless, look to 
international standards for guidance whenever possible). 
 82. See id. Annex A3 (reiterating that the Codex Alimentarius Commission’s 
standards apply to issues of food safety); see also Codex Alimentarius Commission 
Website, http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.jsp (last visited Nov. 11, 
2006) (providing Codex standards in a searchable database and in list form). 
 83. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 3.3.  Paradoxically, the SPS Agreement 
permits member countries to enact sanitary measures that provide lower levels of 
protection than the relevant international standards.  See Bruce A. Silverglade, The 
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures:  Weakening Food Safety 
Regulations to Facilitate Trade?, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 517, 520-22 (2000) (arguing that 
the SPS Agreement, as a trade instrument, fails to provide safe and sanitary foods 
because of its focus on minimizing trade effects).  Silverglade asserts that because 
nothing in the Agreement allows a member country to challenge another member’s 
food safety standards as too low, downward harmonization of global food safety 
standards is inherently built into the trade agreement.  Silverglade thus advocates for 
“an international food safety agreement, not just an international trade agreement 
on food safety” to upwardly harmonize global food conditions.  Id. at 517.  But see 
Kennedy, supra note 22, at 86 (asserting that the SPS Agreement does not require 
“downward harmonization” through the adoption of less stringent measures). 
 84. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 3.3 (stating that members may 
introduce higher levels of sanitary protection if there is scientific justification, or if 
the member determines under Article 5 Assessment of Risk and Determination of 
the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection that the higher level is 
justified); see also Victor, supra note 35, at 876 (perceiving that there are two 
alternatives with respect to international standards:  implement the standard, or 
deviate from it with adequate support). 
 85. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, arts. 5.1-5.5 (directing members to 
consider international risk assessment guidelines, available scientific evidence, 
relevant economic factors, the objective of minimizing negative trade effects, and the 
principle of non-discrimination in the assessment of risks).  Note that the purpose of 
the risk assessment differs depending on whether the measure in question is 
intended to protect human or animal life or health, or plant life or health.  See id. 
Annex A.4 (stating that a risk assessment to protect human or animal life and health 
must establish that there is a risk arising from the presence of additives, toxins, or 
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demonstrate that the measure is necessary to achieve the level of 
sanitary protection that the WTO member has deemed appropriate.86  
Furthermore, other WTO members may request justification for 
deviations from an international standard.87 
Because all members pledge to abide by the SPS Agreement’s 
restrictive provisions, members have the right to take action against 
other countries whose sanitary measures are not in compliance.88  
                                                          
disease-causing organisms, while alternatively depicting that a risk assessment to 
protect plant life and health must show the likelihood of entry, establishment, or 
spread of a pest or disease and the associated biological and economic 
consequences).  Two Article 5 provisions are influenced by other principles of the 
SPS Agreement.  First, Article 2.2 (scientific justification) informs Article 5.1, which 
contains the basic requirement that members base measures on risk assessments; 
Article 5.1 can thus be viewed as a “specific application” of the scientific obligations 
contained in Article 2.2.  EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 180.  The Appellate Body 
emphasized in EC-Hormones that “Articles 2.2 and 5.1 should constantly be read 
together.”  Id.  Second, a violation of Article 5.5 necessarily implicates a violation of 
Article 2.3 (non-discrimination), because Article 5.5 embodies the non-
discrimination principle with respect to the risk assessment requirements.  Appellate 
Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, ¶¶ 243-255, 
WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Australia-Salmon].  In Australia-Salmon, 
the Appellate Body explored the connection between these two non-discrimination 
provisions of the SPS Agreement and concluded that a violation of Article 2.3 can be 
established by “following the complex and indirect route worked out and elaborated 
by Article 5.5.”  Id. ¶ 252.  The Appellate Body bolstered this conclusion with 
reference to its earlier discussion in the EC-Hormones case, where it held that Article 
5.5 marks out “a particular route leading to the same destination set out in Article 
2.3” but stressed that Article 5.5 is not the only route leading to a violation of the first 
sentence of Article 2.3.  Id. ¶ 252 n.195 (citing EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 212). 
 86. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5; EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 193 
(stating that Article 5, when properly read in conjunction with Article 2.2 (scientific 
principle), requires that the results of the risk assessment must warrant, or 
reasonably support, the sanitary measure in question and the corresponding level of 
protection imposed by that measure). 
 87. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5.8 (permitting a member to request 
justification in the form of a risk assessment for a measure if the member believes the 
measure constrains, or has the potential to constrain, its exports); see also supra note 
84 and accompanying text (detailing the procedure to impose a higher level of 
protection when measures depart from international standards). 
 88. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 11 (describing the right to 
consultation and dispute settlement under the Agreement).  To date, there have 
been four cases fully disputed in the WTO for violations of the SPS Agreement.  In 
each, the WTO member was found to have violated the Agreement.  See Japan–Apples, 
supra note 22, ¶¶ 243-244 (finding that Japan’s phytosanitary measure to restrict the 
import of apples contaminated with Erwinia Amylovora, or fire blight, violated Articles 
2.2 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement); Appellate Body Report, Japan—Measures Affecting 
Agricultural Products, ¶¶ 143-144, WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999) [hereinafter 
Japan-Testing] (holding that Japan’s prohibition on the import of eight agricultural 
products, on the basis that these foods may be a host for codling moth, is a 
phytosanitary measure that violates Articles 2.2 and 5.1, and also Article 7 of the 
Agreement (requiring members to notify other WTO members of any changes in 
their sanitary or phytosanitary measures in an effort to promote transparency 
between nations)); Australia–Salmon, supra note 85, ¶¶ 279-280 (concluding that 
Australia’s import ban on fresh, chilled, or frozen salmon caught in the Pacific 
Ocean is a sanitary measure violating Articles 2.2, 2.3, 5.1, and 5.5 of the SPS 
Agreement); EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 253 (determining that the European 
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The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”)89 provides a 
quasi-judicial forum where members may bring disputes and resolve 
claims of non-compliance with any of the WTO Agreements.90  A 
WTO member can, therefore, bring a dispute against the United 
States alleging that Title III of the Bioterrorism Act violates U.S. 
obligations under the SPS Agreement.91 
The case of EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) (“EC-Hormones”) is relevant to the present issue because it 
considered, and resolved under the dispute settlement system, 
allegations that the European Community (“EC”)92 had violated the 
SPS Agreement by discriminating against foreign imports and 
maintaining a sanitary measure without support from a risk 
                                                          
Community violated Articles 3.3 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement); see also Kennedy, 
supra note 22, at 91-100 (providing an overview of both the Panel and Appellate Body 
decisions in the cases of Australia-Salmon, EC–Hormones, and Japan-Testing). 
 89. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 
1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
 90. See William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded its Authority?  
A Consideration of Deference Shown by the System to Member Government Decisions and its Use 
of Issue-Avoidance Techniques, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 79, 79 (2001) (asserting that the DSU 
is the hallmark of the WTO system and is used extensively by WTO members to 
resolve trade disputes with other members).  See generally Kim Van der Borght, The 
Review of the WTO Understanding on Dispute Settlement:  Some Reflections on the Current 
Debate, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1223 (1999) (describing the development of the 
dispute settlement mechanism as a fundamental change from the former GATT to 
the current WTO system and reporting that, generally, WTO members who have 
employed the dispute settlement system to resolve trade disputes are satisfied with its 
operation); WTO Webpage, Understanding the WTO:  Settling Disputes, http:// 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 
2006) (describing the dispute settlement process as the “central pillar of the [WTO] 
multilateral trading system” and further defining a dispute as “when one country 
adopts a trade policy measure or takes some action that one or more fellow-WTO 
members considers to be breaking the WTO agreements, or to be a failure to live up 
to obligations”).  There are two levels of review in the dispute settlement system.  
Initially, there is a trial-like review by a Panel, which issues a report with its findings.  
A WTO member can then appeal a decision of the Panel to the Appellate Body, the 
highest level of review in the dispute settlement system, which will issue a final 
determination.  WTO Webpage, supra. 
 91. Cf. Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
Complaint by the United States, ¶ 8.51, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter 
EC-Hormones, Complaint by the United States] (declaring that the complaining WTO 
member in any dispute under the DSU bears the initial burden of making a prima 
facie case of non-compliance with the Agreement). 
 92. The European Community (“EC”) is the predecessor to what is now 
commonly known as the European Union.  See RANDY CHARLES EPPING, A BEGINNER’S 
GUIDE TO THE WORLD ECONOMY 111-14 (Vintage Books 3d ed. 2001) (1992) 
(describing the birth of the European Union).  Epping traces the history of 
European economic unification from the original European Coal and Steel 
Community, formed in 1957 as a common market for steel and coal among six 
Western European nations, to the current free-trade “megazone” that is the 
European Union.  Id. 
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assessment.93  Concerned about possible health dangers, the EC 
imposed an import ban on all meat products from animals injected 
with growth hormones.94  After both the United States and Canada 
challenged the measure, the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones 
considered principally whether the EC had violated the SPS 
Agreement’s principles of harmonization, discrimination, and risk 
assessment.95 
In the context of this Comment, the Appellate Body’s construction 
and interpretation of the obligations under Article 2.3 and 5.5 (non-
discrimination) and Article 5.1 (risk assessment) are particularly 
important.  The case outlined a three-part test to determine whether 
a measure unjustifiably discriminates against other members in 
                                                          
 93. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 1-8 (introducing the issues on appeal to 
the Appellate Body).  The Appellate Body consolidated two Panel Reports, resolving 
complaints lodged against the EC by the United States and Canada respectively, into 
one case at the appellate level because both Panels consisted of the same three Panel 
members and considered the identical issue:  that of the legitimacy of the import ban 
on hormone-treated meat products.  See id. ¶ 1; see also Panel Report, EC Measures 
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by Canada, WT/DS48/ 
R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter EC-Hormones, Complaint by Canada]; EC-
Hormones, Complaint by the United States, supra note 91.  See generally Victor, supra note 
35, at 898-904 (outlining the specific findings of both of the Panels and the Appellate 
Body with respect to the EC import ban on meat products). 
 94. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 1-5 (laying out the facts on appeal); EC-
Hormones, Complaint by the United States, supra note 91, ¶¶ II.26-33 (describing the 
events that prompted the EC ban, beginning with the growing, illegal use of 
dethylstilboestrol (DES) in veal production operations in France, and corresponding 
European concerns about the health-related risks that might stem from the use of 
such hormones). 
 95. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 157-177 (examining the Panels’ findings 
that the EC ban was a more stringent measure than the relevant international 
standard and, thus, violated the harmonization principles in Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of 
the SPS Agreement); id. ¶¶ 178-209 (discussing the SPS Agreement’s requirement 
that measures be based on a risk assessment under Article 5 of the Agreement); id. 
¶¶ 210-246, (reviewing the Panels’ determinations that the EC ban violated the SPS 
Agreement by discriminating against foreign industry).  The Appellate Body’s 
discussion of the non-discrimination and risk assessment principles is pertinent to 
this Comment.  However, its examination of the principle of harmonization, and 
explicit reversal of the Panels’ holdings on this point, is “perhaps its single most 
important ruling on SPS-related issues.”  Victor, supra note 35, at 900.  Victor 
explains that the Appellate Body overturned the Panels’ interpretations, which would 
have required sanitary measures to conform to international standards, in favor of a 
“more common-sense definition . . . [that] a measure can be based on international 
standards without conforming” to them, thus allowing member countries 
significantly more flexibility to implement domestic measures.  Id. (emphasis added).  
While the Appellate Body reversed a finding of an Article 3.3 violation on this basis, 
it ultimately concluded that the EC measure was, in fact, inconsistent with Article 3.3 
of the Agreement because of the interrelation between the harmonization and risk 
assessment principles and because of its conclusion that Article 5.1 was violated.  See 
EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 209; see also infra note 228 (explaining the interactions 
between Article 3 harmonization and Article 5 risk assessment). 
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violation of Articles 2.3 and 5.5.96  EC-Hormones also set forth a 
framework to analyze a member’s obligation to justify sanitary 
measures with a supportive risk assessment under Article 5.1.97  The 
Appellate Body ultimately determined that the EC import ban did 
not discriminate against foreign industry,98 yet it concluded that the 
measure violated the SPS Agreement because it was not supported by 
a proper risk assessment.99  This Comment proceeds to analyze Title 
III under the SPS Agreement using EC-Hormones as a guide through 
the WTO dispute settlement process.  Analysis of the Title and 
analogy to EC-Hormones will demonstrate how Title III violates Articles 
2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement by discriminating against foreign 
                                                          
 96. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 210-215 (deriving the following three-part 
test from the text of the SPS Agreement, which determines that Article 5.5 has been 
violated if:  (1) the member failed to require comparable levels of protection in 
comparable situations; (2) the application of varied levels of protection in 
comparable situations resulted in arbitrary or unjustifiable differences; and (3) the 
arbitrary or unjustifiable differences resulted in discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade).  Under this holding, all three elements of the test must be 
satisfied to sustain a violation of Article 5.5.  Id. ¶ 215; but cf. WTO Website, Dispute 
Settlement System Training Module Chapter 7, Legal Effect of Panel and Appellate 
Body Reports,  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt 
_e/c7s2p1_e.htm (explaining that, there is no rule of stare decisis (binding 
precedent) in WTO proceedings and that the Appellate Body is not required 
maintain the same legal interpretations it has advanced in the past).  However, if the 
past interpretation is persuasive and its reasoning sound, it is likely a panel or the 
Appellate Body will subsequently follow it.  Id.;  see, e.g., Australia-Salmon, supra note 
85, ¶ 252 n.195 (discussing and retaining the interpretation of EC-Hormones with 
respect to the interplay between the non-discrimination and risk assessment Articles 
of the Agreement).    
 97. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 178-209 (reviewing the Panels’ statutory 
constructions with respect to Article 5, conducting its own examination of the 
Article, and interpreting Article 5.1 to contain a two-part test that sanitary measures 
be both procedurally and substantively “based on” a risk assessment conforming to 
the additional requirements of Articles 5.2-5.6); see also infra Part II.B.2.b (outlining 
the two-part test of Article 5.1). 
 98. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 246 (reversing the Panels’ conclusions that 
the European Community acted inconsistently with Article 5.5 or violated the SPS 
Agreement under that principle); see also Victor, supra note 35, at 903 (opining that 
the Appellate Body deemed the third prong of the discrimination test, whether the 
differences in levels of protection harmed trade, to be the most important in finding 
that Article 5.5 was not violated); infra Part II.B.1 (comparing the discrimination 
inherent in Title III regulations to the finding of the Appellate Body in the EC-
Hormones case). 
 99. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 198-200, 208 (agreeing with the Panels 
that the scientific evidence presented by the EC, purportedly to support the 
hormone ban, merely represented general studies that failed to address the 
particular risk at issue and, as such, the EC failed to advance “relevant 
documentation” to support its import prohibition); see also infra note 213 and 
accompanying text (describing the EC-Hormones holding with respect to risk 
assessment and comparing that holding to the assessment of Title III’s compliance 
with the SPS Agreement). 
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food exporters and further violates the risk assessment requirement 
of Article 5.1.100 
II. TITLE III VIOLATES U.S. TRADE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SPS 
AGREEMENT AND FAILS TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION AGAINST 
THE THREAT OF BIOTERRORISM 
Title III is subject to the SPS Agreement because it is a sanitary 
measure and it adversely affects international trade by imposing high 
costs on foreign exporters seeking access to the U.S. market.101  
Despite the FDA’s assertions to the contrary,102 Title III violates U.S. 
trade obligations under the SPS Agreement.  First, Title III 
discriminates against foreign exporters in violation of Articles 2.3 and 
                                                          
 100. This comparison is also appropriate because the import ban at issue in EC-
Hormones is analogous to Title III’s regulation of food imports.  First, although Title 
III is largely a responsive, and therefore innovative, measure to be regulated under 
the SPS Agreement, it is comparable to the EC ban because both are designed to 
minimize harmful additives in the food supply and to restrict trade as a result.  See 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-188, pmbl., 116 Stat. 594, 594 (expressing that the Act’s purpose is to 
prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism); id. §§ 301-336, 116 Stat. at 662-81 
(codified as amended at scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.A. (West 2006)) (acting with 
the goal to protect the safety and security of the food supply specifically, under the 
auspices of the Act’s general goal of bioterrorism prevention and response); EC-
Hormones, Complaint by the United States, supra note 91, ¶¶ 2.2-2.10 (describing the EC 
Directives and banning three naturally occurring and three artificially-produced 
hormones from being administered to farm animals).  Second, highly publicized 
health incidents instigated both measures.  Compare id. ¶ 2.26 (explaining that the 
EC ban responded to reports in the 1970s and 1980s of developmental problems in 
children, suspected to be caused by hormone-injected meat, and that, as a result of a 
subsequent consumer boycott of veal and other meat products that severely affected 
the European market, one goal of the hormone ban was to restore confidence in the 
market), with Hodge, supra note 2, at 254 (detailing how in the United States, the 
2001 anthrax attacks ignited widespread concern about the threat of bioterrorism, 
particularly because the letters were mailed to government and media members in 
three states and the District of Columbia), and Fidler, supra note 2, at 10 (noting the 
public coverage of the anthrax incidents and that the “nation watched” as the 
situation unfolded and the government scrambled to respond).  See also 
Research!America, supra note 13 (reporting that, shortly after the attacks and before 
passage of the Bioterrorism Act, nearly ninety percent of Americans doubted the 
government’s ability to prevent or respond to future biological attacks). 
 101. See infra Part II.A (analyzing Title III under the requirements of the SPS 
Agreement and concluding that the measure is subject to the Agreement’s 
jurisdiction). 
 102. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,897 
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule); Prior Notice of 
Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 
and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974, 58,981 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule) (questioning Title III’s compliance with 
international trade obligations, under comments to registration and prior notice 
respectively, with each comment eliciting the same generic FDA response:  “FDA is 
aware of the international trade obligations . . . [and believes these regulations are] 
consistent with these international obligations”). 
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5.5 because it causes foreign industries to incur significantly 
increased transaction costs in order to trade with the United States 
and imposes procedural conditions on foreign facilities alone.103  
Second, because no risk assessment supports Title III, it further 
violates Article 5.1 of the Agreement.104 
A. In an Effort to Protect Americans from Food Bioterrorism, Title III 
Inadvertently Restricts International Trade and, Therefore, is Subject to the 
SPS Agreement 
The SPS Agreement applies only to those sanitary measures that, 
directly or indirectly, restrict international trade.105  Therefore, one 
must establish primarily that the protectionary measure in question, 
in this case Title III, is a sanitary measure as defined in the 
Agreement106 and then further demonstrate that the sanitary measure 
negatively impacts trade.107  Title III is subject to the SPS Agreement 
because it satisfies the SPS Agreement’s broad definition of a sanitary 
measure and restricts free trade by imposing increased costs 
exclusively on foreign food exporters. 
Title III meets the definition of a sanitary measure as described in 
the SPS Agreement because it aims to “protect human . . . life or 
health . . . from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or 
disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs.”108  Title 
III imposes dual levels of protection against bioterrorism:  to prevent 
an attack using biological agents from being realized, using 
information provided in prior notice submissions109 and to respond 
                                                          
 103. See infra Part II.B.1 (contending that Title III violates the three-part non-
discrimination test set forth in EC-Hormones). 
 104. See infra Part II.B.2 (analyzing Title III under the two-part framework also 
announced in EC-Hormones and maintaining that the measure fails to satisfy Article 
5.1 of the SPS Agreement). 
 105. SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 1.1. 
 106. See id. Annex A.1 (providing four alternative definitions, each of which 
qualify as a sanitary or phytosanitary measure). 
 107. See Kennedy, supra note 22, at 83 (elaborating that the SPS Agreement 
applies only to measures with direct or indirect effects on trade).  Notice that benign 
measures that ensure sanitary protection but do not harm international trade are not 
subject to the SPS Agreement.  SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 1.1. 
 108. SPS Agreement, supra note 19, Annex A.1(b) (emphasis added); see Aaron A. 
Ostrovsky, Note, The New Codex Alimentarius Commission Standards for Food Created with 
Modern Biotechnology:  Implications for the EC GMO Framework’s Compliance with the SPS 
Agreement, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 813, 823 (2004) (performing a similar analogy to 
define the “Deliberate Release Directive,” a European Community regulation 
pertaining to the production and movement of genetically modified foods within the 
European Union, as an SPS measure subject to the SPS Agreement).  Ostrovsky 
explains that the EC ban on hormones qualifies as a sanitary measure under the 
definition contained in Annex A, subparagraph (a).  Id. 
 109. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (predicting that prior notice will aid 
both prevention and response to bioterrorism activities by providing the Agency with 
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effectively to limit the spread of diseased or infected food products, 
using registration information and other administrative authority.110 
Although the SPS Agreement has traditionally been applied to 
import bans on specific food products,111 nothing in the language, 
context, or interpretation of the Agreement bars its application to 
import controls affecting food products generally.112  So long as Title 
III’s protective controls are intended to protect Americans and the 
American food supply from the danger of deliberate contamination 
and the use of biological toxins in food, it is immaterial how that level 
of protection is achieved for the purpose of defining the title as a 
sanitary measure.113  The overall purpose of the Bioterrorism Act—to 
prevent, prepare for, and respond to bioterrorism114—and the specific 
mandate of Title III—to protect against the purposeful use of 
biological contamination in the food supply115—demonstrates that 
Title III can be defined as a sanitary measure to protect human life 
and health from the dangers of food bioterrorism.116 
                                                          
increased information about food shipments imported into the United States, thus 
allowing the Agency to preemptively respond to threats and prevent potential 
contamination from entering the United States, or from being disseminated 
throughout the United States). 
 110. See supra notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text (listing among the benefits of 
registration that the provision will help the FDA deter and respond to bioterrorism, 
thus protecting the American public from bioterrorist activities). 
 111. See, e.g., Australia-Salmon, supra note 85 (challenging Australia’s import ban 
on Pacific salmon); EC-Hormones, supra note 25 (contesting the EC ban on growth 
hormones in meat products). 
 112. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 1.1 (describing the broad subjects to 
which the Agreement applies). 
 113. See id. Annex A.1 (defining sanitary measures broadly, without mention of 
specific or traditional types of food regulation, such as import bans). 
 114. Supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
 115. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, §§ 301-336, 116 Stat. 594, 662-81 (codified as amended 
at scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.A. (West 2006)) (clarifying its purpose in the title:  
“Protecting Safety and Security of Food and Drug Supply”). 
 116. Title III alternatively qualifies as a sanitary measure under the SPS 
Agreement, which includes approval procedures in the definition of sanitary 
measures.  See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, Annex A.2; see also id. Annex C.1 
(defining approval procedures expansively as procedures to check or ensure the 
fulfillment of a sanitary measure).  Only full compliance with Title III will make a 
food product eligible for entry into the United States; thus, Title III is an approval 
procedure under the Agreement.  Consequently, Title III is a sanitary measure under 
either the definition in Annex A.1(b) or under the approval procedure of Annex C.  
Because the provisions applicable to approval procedures mirror those in the 
broader Agreement, it is unnecessary to distinguish between the two definitions.  
Compare id. Annex C.1(a) (“Members shall ensure . . . that:  (a) such procedures are 
undertaken and completed without undue delay and in no less favourable manner 
for imported products than for like domestic products.”), with id. art. 2.3 (“Members 
shall ensure that their sanitary . . . measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably 
discriminate between Members . . . including between their own territory and that of 
other Members.”).  Hence, both the general Agreement and Annex C embrace the 
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In addition to meeting the criteria of a sanitary measure, Title III’s 
detrimental effect on international trade ultimately subjects it to the 
Agreement’s jurisdiction.  Title III is burdensome and costly for 
foreign food facilities.117  Registration and prior notice provisions 
discriminate against foreign facilities, both by the letter of the 
regulation and by the disparate costs imposed.  Efficient businesses 
operate in markets only where it is profitable to do so.118  Rather than 
incur increased costs and administrative burdens for the privilege to 
compete in the U.S. market, some foreign manufacturers may simply 
cease exporting to the United States.119 
The FDA has acknowledged the disparate cost to foreign food 
exporters imposed by registration and prior notice.  Of the nearly 
$330 million in projected first year registration costs,120 the FDA 
estimates over ninety-three percent will be borne by foreign 
facilities.121  This discrepancy only increases in subsequent years.122  
                                                          
notion that a member should not favor its domestic industry over foreign trading 
industries. 
 117. Compare Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,949, 
tbl.12 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) 
(summarizing the total annual cost to foreign food facilities to comply with 
registration at $228,800,000), and Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 58,974, 59,046, tbl.25 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim 
rule) (computing total annual prior notice costs to foreign food facilities at 
$260,633,000), with Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security 
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,948, 
tbl.11 (estimating domestic expenses as a result of registration at only $6,900,000).  
Note that there is no corresponding expense to domestic food facilities as a result of 
section 307 prior notice because this provision is applicable to foreign industry only. 
 118. See EPPING, supra note 92, at 9 (providing a basic snapshot of how 
international trade operates and stressing that trade is a mechanism for wealth, as 
“[n]o country would sell something abroad unless it could make a profit”). 
 119. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,943 
(predicting that sixteen percent of food facilities will cease export to the United 
States rather than comply with Title III provisions); cf. Daniel Pruzin, WTO Review 
Urges U.S. to Head Off Protectionism; China Criticizes Port Reaction, 23 INT’L TRADE REP. 
437, 437-38 (2006) (citing WTO’s past praises of the United States for its role as a 
“key engine of global growth” in providing the world’s largest market for foreign 
exporters, but current calls for the United States to reduce recent protectionist 
regulation, including the Bioterrorism Act). 
 120. Note that this figure is much higher than the amount referenced supra in 
note 7 with respect to registration costs.  This is because the amount in note 7 
reflects only the cost of the U.S. agent requirement of the registration provision, 
while the above stated amount accounts for all costs associated with registration 
compliance, including the U.S. agent costs, as well as expenses for the collection and 
submission of registration information, periodic updates, and incidental costs of non-
compliance.  Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,949, tbl.12. 
 121. See id. at 58,950, tbl.13 (condensing into table form a summary of the 
predicted costs of registration to all affected food producers in the four years after 
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The FDA also estimates that first year costs of prior notice, applicable 
only to foreign industry, will top $360 million and it projects an 
annual cost of $260 million thereafter.123  Therefore, in the first year 
of implementation, foreign food exporters seeking access to the U.S. 
market will be forced to pay almost $670 million124 just to comply with 
Title III registration and prior notice.125 
While the FDA has modified some of its regulations in an effort to 
reduce the costs of Title III compliance,126 these changes fail to fully 
                                                          
the implementation date).  The total foreign share of first-year registration costs is 
roughly $306 million.  Id. 
 122. See id. (forecasting that the foreign share of registration costs will increase to 
ninety-seven percent for each year predicted after the first year of implementation). 
 123. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 59,046, tbl.25 
(summarizing the estimated costs of prior notice for the first year, and annual costs 
thereafter). 
 124. See supra notes 121 and 123 and accompanying text (calculating the first-year 
costs of $306 million for registration and $360 million for prior notice, totaling $666 
million for first year Title III costs); Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 57,505, 57,507 (Oct. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (finding that 
the expense of hiring and maintaining a U.S. agent in order to comply with 
registration will likely remain consistent at $165 million).  Therefore, although the 
costs of Title III compliance will drop after the first year, foreign facilities will still 
incur expenses of approximately $425 million each year thereafter, which domestic 
facilities will not incur.  See supra text accompanying note 123 (providing the prior 
notice figure, which, when added with the above amount of compliance with the U.S. 
agent requirement, yields the approximate total yearly expenses of registration and 
prior notice compliance). 
 125. This financial burden will disproportionately affect small business foreign 
exporters who have fewer financial resources and ship lower quantities of imports 
into the United States.  As these businesses generally have tight monetary constraints, 
many are likely to cease export to the U.S. rather than suffer the increased costs.  See 
Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,943 (estimating that of 
the sixteen percent of firms predicted to cease export to the United States, most 
facilities that will be affected are small businesses that annually export relatively few 
items to the United States).  In turn, the absence of these exporters from the U.S. 
trade market will adversely affect domestic small business importers who will be 
forced to find alternative sources of goods.  See White House Fact Sheet:  Opening 
New Markets for America’s Small Businesses (Mar. 24, 2004), http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040324-7.html (stating that ninety-seven 
percent of all U.S. exporters are small to medium-sized businesses that likely rely on 
small business foreign counterparts).  See generally Onyango & Turvey, supra note 15 
(reporting that small businesses within the United States fear the domestic economic 
repercussions of the Bioterrorism Act if some foreign firms are forced out of 
business). 
 126. See, e.g., Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,898 (noting 
changes in registration regulations with regard to the definition of “food” and “farm” 
and other general clarifications that will benefit all facilities required to register but 
do nothing to alleviate the particular cost to foreign facilities of hiring and retaining 
a U.S. agent); Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,981 
(documenting that the FDA considered its action to reduce the timeframe for 
BOISEN_OFFTOPRINTER 1/30/2007  12:45:09 PM 
694 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:3 
address foreign trade concerns.  Foreign facilities are still responsible 
for the costs of hiring a U.S. agent and submitting prior notice while 
domestic facilities freely move shipments inside the United States 
without financial burden.127  Consequently, WTO members, whose 
cries have fallen on deaf FDA ears, can claim that Title III, as a 
sanitary measure that adversely affects international trade, violates 
the SPS Agreement. 
B. Title III Violates U.S. Trade Obligations to the WTO 
Title III violates Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement by 
arbitrarily discriminating against the foreign food industry.128  
Because the measure is not supported by a risk assessment, Title III 
also violates Article 5.1 of the Agreement.129  Furthermore, plausible 
arguments130 can be made, but which are not the subject of this 
Comment, that Title III also disregards the remaining major 
principles under the Agreement of scientific justification,131 
equivalence,132 and harmonization.133 
                                                          
submission of prior notice as one of the changes made to minimize the impact of the 
requirement. 
 127. See supra note 117 (contrasting the financial burden on foreign facilities with 
the relative financial freedom of domestic industry). 
 128. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 129. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 130. These arguments are valid, but speculative.  For example, with respect to 
harmonization, the WTO could find that the Bioterrorism Act’s deviations from 
existing standards do not impose higher, but instead comparable, levels of 
protection. Member’s must base measures on international standards and guidelines, 
but are only required to justify higher levels of sanitary protection under Article 3.3.  
SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 3.3.  
 131. The FDA analogized to scientific evidence gathered from past incidents of 
accidental contamination to express the risk of bioterrorism.  See, e.g., Registration of 
Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,953, tbl.15 (using data from previous 
accidental food outbreaks, including incidents caused by imported foods, to show 
the possible costs and risks of a bioterrorist strike against the food supply).  However, 
Title III’s measures cannot be justified under Article 2.2 without scientific data 
signifying the threat and effect of intentional contamination.  This failure to support 
Title III with scientific data pertaining specifically to deliberate contamination 
arguably violates Article 2.1.  See infra note 217 (highlighting the difference between 
intentional and accidental food contamination). 
 132. The FDA has indicated unequivocally that it will not allow any comparable 
communications link, such as a foreign embassy or designated agent living abroad, to 
fulfill the U.S. agent requirement.  See, e.g., Registration of Food Facilities Under the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 
Fed. Reg. at 58,915 (requesting that the FDA allow the agent for foreign facilities to 
be located outside the United States, to which the FDA responded that the 
requirement that the agent be physically present in the United States is “consistent 
with the plain language of the Bioterrorism Act” and is further consistent with FDA’s 
regulation of other imported products, such as drugs and medical devices).  The 
Agency has also affirmed that any imported food must submit prior notice to gain 
entry to the U.S. market.  See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public 
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1. Title III discriminates against foreign industry in violation of Articles 2.3 
& 5.5 of the SPS Agreement 
Title III violates Articles 2.3 and 5.5 because it arbitrarily imposes 
unequal levels of sanitary protection in comparable situations and 
acts to restrict foreign trade and discriminate against foreign 
industry.  Articles 2.3 and 5.5 work in tandem to prohibit WTO 
members from maintaining unjustifiably different levels of protection 
in comparable situations.134  These two provisions of the Agreement 
embody the broader goal of achieving consistency in the application 
of sanitary measures on a global scale.135  Under the three part test 
                                                          
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 58,974, 59,016 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule) 
(rejecting a comment that a waiver should be adopted for imports that are deemed 
safe but have completed only partial prior notice and stating that such a waiver 
would be “antithetical” to the goal of prior notice and insisting that admission will be 
refused to any product with incomplete prior notice).  Therefore, any exporting 
country’s domestic measure that achieves the same level of sanitary protection 
against bioterrorism through means other than the use of a U.S. agent and prior 
notice will likely be rejected by the FDA.  This implicit prohibition on the use of any 
equivalent measure designed to prevent and respond to bioterrorism by WTO 
members directly contradicts the equivalence principle contained in Article 4.2.  SPS 
Agreement, supra note 19, art. 4.2. 
 133. Critics could make an additional argument that Title III imposes a higher 
level of sanitary protection than the two relevant Codex Alimentarius Commission 
standards and, thus, is not fully harmonized with international standards.  Title III 
imposes a higher level of protection than the standard for the exchange of 
information in emergency situations by requiring foreign facilities to designate an 
agent specifically for the purpose of emergency communication.  See Principles and 
Guidelines for the Exchange of Information in Food Safety Emergency Situations, 
Codex Alimentarius Commission Guideline, CAC/GL 19-1995, revised in 2004, 
available at http://www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/36/CXG_019_ 
2004e.pdf (emphasizing that the “global nature of food trade requires that 
[emergency] communication occur between nations at the appropriate governmental 
level”) (emphasis added).  Title III also adds another level of protection to the 
international standard for routine food rejections by refusing the importation of 
pure, uncontaminated foods merely for a lack of technical reporting under 
registration or prior notice.  See Guidelines for the Exchange of Information Between 
Countries on Rejections of Imported Food, Codex Alimentarius Commission 
Guideline, CAC/GL 25-1997, available at http://www.codexalimentarius.net/ 
download/standards/353/CXG_025e.pdf (noting that the primary reason for 
imported food rejections is usually food impurities in content or packaging).  
Accordingly, it is possible that Title III violates, outright, Article 3.3.  See also infra 
note 228 (concluding that Title III violates Article 5.1 of the Agreement and 
discussing the interrelation between this finding and the harmonization principle 
established in Article 3.3). 
 134. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, at ¶ 212 (reading Article 5.5 in context with 
Article 2.3 and finding they elaborate the same objectives); see also supra note 85 
(explaining the interrelation between Article 2.3 and 5.5 in greater detail). 
 135. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 213 (emphasizing that the objective of 
Article 5.5 is to achieve “consistency in the application of the concept of appropriate 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection”).  The Appellate Body stressed that the 
goal set is not “absolute or perfect consistency,” but that over time consistency will 
develop with the continued administration of the SPS Agreement and enforcement 
against arbitrary or unjustifiable inconsistencies.  Id. 
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enunciated in EC-Hormones, a member has violated Article 5.5, and by 
association Article 2.3, if:  (1) the member applies different levels of 
protection in comparable situations; (2) the application of the 
different levels of protection is arbitrary or unjustifiable; and 
(3) either discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade results.136  
A dispute for discrimination under the SPS Agreement will consider 
each of these three elements.137  
Title III’s registration and prior notice requirements impose 
disproportionate levels of protection on foreign and domestic food 
producers.  To examine and compare these levels of protection, 
there are two relevant inquiries:  the level of basic protection against 
contaminated foods under prior notice and the level of responsive 
protection via increased communication under registration. 
Title III imposes different levels of preventative protection between 
imported and domestic food products.  Prior notice is required for 
foreign imports to prevent contaminated foods from entering the 
U.S. market.138  However, no equivalent reporting procedure is 
required of domestic facilities before their food products move within 
the United States.139  This artificial distinction appears to rest on the 
assumption that imported products are more likely to be used as a 
vehicle for bioterrorism, an assumption that the FDA does not fully 
justify or support.140 
Domestic facilities are required to establish and maintain certain 
records under section 306 of the Bioterrorism Act—Maintenance and 
Inspection of Records for Foods (“Records Maintenance”)141—but 
                                                          
 136. See id. ¶ 214 (elaborating the three-part test stemming from Article 5.5).  In 
other cases, the Appellate Body has considered factors in addition to this basic three-
part test.  See Davey, supra note 90, at 91 (imparting two additional factors considered 
in Australia-Salmon:  “the change in the conclusion between the draft risk assessment 
and final risk assessment; and the absence of measures controlling internal fish 
movements within Australia”). 
 137. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 215 (describing the three-part test as 
cumulative and, as a result, emphasizing that each condition must be fulfilled in 
order to sustain a violation of Article 5.5); see also supra note 96 (explaining that, 
while prior decisions are not binding in the WTO system, they are given deference if 
persuasive and well-reasoned).   
 138. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 381 (West 2006). 
 139. See id. (limiting its provisions to “the case of an article of food that is being 
imported or offered for import into the United States”). 
 140. See infra notes 218-219 and accompanying text (concluding, under the 
analysis of the risk assessment principle, that Title III maintains an artificial 
foreign/domestic distinction that is neither explicitly supported by either FDA or 
Congress, nor is implicitly supported by data of past incidents of intentional food 
contamination in the United States, which all suggest bioterrorist incidents are more 
likely to involve domestic persons using domestic food products to carry out attacks). 
 141. See § 306, 116 Stat. at 669-70 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.A. (West 2006)) (requiring any domestic individual, partnership or 
BOISEN_OFFTOPRINTER 1/30/2007  12:45:09 PM 
2007] TITLE III OF THE BIOTERRORISM ACT 697 
this regulation is not an equivalent burden on domestic industry.  
Many companies keep such records in the normal course of 
business.142  Moreover, these records need only be documented, but 
not continually submitted, to the FDA and have no bearing on a 
domestic facility’s ability to transport shipments between states.143  In 
addition, while non-compliance with both prior notice and records 
maintenance is a prohibited act,144 only failure to provide prior notice 
results in seizure and detainment of the food shipment.145  
Accordingly, Title III imposes a stricter level of protection on food 
imports than it does on corresponding domestic products. 
Title III further applies different levels of protection to domestic 
and foreign food manufacturers in terms of communication 
requirements.  While registration requires both domestic and foreign 
food facilities to designate an emergency contact,146 the U.S. agent 
constraints are more burdensome than the domestic requirements.147  
                                                          
corporation that manufactures, processes, packs, transports, distributes, receives, 
holds, or imports food to record the immediate source and recipient of all food 
goods). 
 142. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records Under the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 
71,562, 71,566 (Dec. 9, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 11) (describing that 
the final rule merely requires what many businesses keep as records during normal 
business recordkeeping and that the Agency recognizes this as an attempt to 
minimize the burden of additional documentation). 
 143. See id. (reiterating that if a facility’s existing recordkeeping system already 
contains the required information under records maintenance, no additional 
conditions are required and a facility need only keep such records available for a 
possible inspection). 
 144. See FDA Prior Notice of Imported Food, 21 C.F.R. § 1.284 (2006) (making 
failure to submit prior notice a prohibited act under § 301(ee) of the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 331(ee) (2000))); FDA 
Establishment, Maintenance, and Availability of Records, 21 C.F.R § 1.363 (2006) 
(designating failure to comply with records maintenance as a prohibited act as well). 
 145. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.283(a)(1)(i)-(iii) (explaining that imported food will be 
held within the port of arrival if prior notice is not provided).  But see 21 C.F.R 
§ 1.363 (including no corresponding provision in the regulation of section 306 
Records Maintenance). 
 146. See FDA Registration of Food Facilities, 21 C.F.R. § 1.232(e) (2006) 
(expecting a domestic facility to include the emergency contact phone number with 
the information submitted for FDA registration); id. § 1.232(d) (asking foreign 
facilities to include the emergency contact phone number of their U.S. agent in 
registration); see also id. § 1.233(e) (allowing foreign facilities to designate an 
emergency contact other than their U.S. agent, but explaining that the FDA will 
consider the agent the default emergency contact unless otherwise indicated). 
 147. Compare Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,923, 
58,927 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (noting 
FDA changes in the interim rule that lessen the emergency contact information 
requirements and alleviate the burden for domestic facilities by allowing them to 
utilize “already established emergency procedures” in providing emergency contact 
information for FDA purposes), with id. at 58,915-16 (suggesting multiple changes in 
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Domestic facilities are permitted to use existing employees148 in the 
role of emergency contact,149 submit general contact information 
instead of the name of a specific individual,150 and can further choose 
to designate an emergency contact at the corporate level.151  Quite the 
opposite, foreign firms are specifically constrained to choose an 
emergency contact for each facility who is physically present in the 
United States and who must be expressly named.152 
                                                          
the U.S. agent requirements to minimize the burden on foreign entities, only to have 
each dismissed by the FDA). 
 148. The use of existing employees allows domestic facilities to rotate different 
employees internally through the role of emergency contact without updating 
registration information, while foreign facilities must update their registration to 
reflect any change in their designated U.S. agent most likely to be the default 
emergency contact under 21 C.F.R. § 1.283(d).  But see Registration of Food Facilities 
Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,915 (allowing foreign facilities to use existing contacts in 
the United States as their U.S. agent, in response to a comment that the U.S. agent 
requirement is “onerous and potentially trade-restrictive”).  However, only ten 
percent of foreign facilities are estimated to have such contacts readily available that 
would qualify as a U.S. agent. Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 70 Fed. Reg. 
57,505, 57,507 (Oct. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20); see Registration of 
Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,943 (estimating that, at the time, ten 
percent of foreign facilities currently had U.S. representatives or existing business 
contacts within the United States who could function as the U.S. agent for that 
facility); cf. id. at 58,916 (limiting the ability of foreign facilities to use government 
officials in the United States to act as U.S. agents because of concerns that the duties 
of the U.S. agent may conflict with the duties of foreign government representation). 
 149. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5,378, 5,384 
(proposed Feb. 3, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (permitting domestic 
facilities latitude in determining how to comply with the domestic emergency contact 
requirement). 
 150. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,923 
(modifying the emergency contact requirements so that domestic facilities do not 
need to designate an individual if the FDA can contact a live person representing the 
facility twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week). 
 151. See id. (consenting to a comment that proposed that domestic emergency 
contact information may be maintained at the corporate headquarters, if determined 
appropriate for that facility).  Ironically, as a result of Title III’s definition of the term 
“domestic,” a facility located in the United States but owned by an international 
corporation could be allowed to maintain an emergency contact on foreign soil, at 
that facility’s headquarters, while foreign owned food facilities are forced to maintain 
such contacts within the United States.  See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d (West 2006) (defining a 
domestic facility by geographic location, as “a facility located in any of the States or 
Territories” of the United States, not by ownership of the facility). 
 152. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,923 (listing 
registration requirements for foreign facilities, making mandatory the inclusion of an 
agent located in the United States); FDA Registration of Food Facilities, 21 C.F.R. 
§ 1.232(d) (2006) (explaining the requirements for a foreign facilities’ emergency 
contact); see also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (elaborating on the U.S. 
agent requirements for foreign facilities). 
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Additionally, registration requirements will be enforced exclusively 
against foreign facilities.  Food offered for import from a foreign 
facility that is not registered correctly will be detained and refused 
entry,153 but domestic facilities suffer no corresponding consequence 
for the same failure.154  Registration therefore requires a stricter level 
of protection on foreign food producers by requiring a designated 
U.S. agent and by seizing and detaining foreign food products from 
unregistered or improperly registered facilities. 
It is not sufficient to merely show Title III’s imposition of different 
levels of protection.  Under the three-part EC-Hormones test, these 
differences must also be arbitrary or unjustified and discriminate 
against foreign trade in order to violate the SPS Agreement.155 
The different levels of protection imposed by Title III are arbitrary 
because they are based solely on a superficial foreign/domestic 
distinction.  Recent terrorist attacks on the United States have been 
perpetrated by both domestic and foreign individuals,156 and 
previously documented bioterrorism attacks in the United States have 
largely been deployed against domestic food sources, by domestic 
persons.157  There is little compelling evidence to suggest that foreign 
                                                          
 153. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 381 (West 2006); see also 21 C.F.R. § 1.241(c); supra 
note 47 (describing the various consequences of failing to register, including seizure 
and detention of the imported shipment or refusal of admission into the United 
States).  As a result of FDA detention, perishable food may spoil or customers may be 
frustrated by late or canceled shipments, causing foreign facilities to incur incidental 
costs such as the loss of valuable business contracts. 
 154. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 381 (West 2006) (mandating consequences for failing to 
register only for imported food products). 
 155. See supra text accompanying note 136 (explaining the three-part test); see also 
EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 219-246 (describing the final two parts of the three-
part test and applying the test to determine if the different EC levels of protection 
were arbitrary and unjustified and a violation of Article 5.5). 
 156. Two visible attacks on the World Trade Center in New York demonstrate the 
acts of external, foreign terrorists.  See Alexander, supra note 13, at 71-72 (describing 
the activities of foreign-based al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, including the 1993 
attack on the World Trade Center); Christopher Drew & Judith Miller, A Nation 
Challenged:  Washington Concerned By Moves of Saudis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2001, at B4 
(reporting that the majority of the suspected September 11th hijackers were of Saudi 
Arabian descent).  However, the United States also has a history of domestic terrorist 
attacks.  See Elizabeth Gleick, Who Are They?  The Oklahoma Blast Reveals the Paranoid 
Life and Times of Accused Bomber Timothy McVeigh and his Right-Wing Associates, TIME, 
May 1, 1995, at 44 (providing a history of the suspects in the Oklahoma City 
bombing—Timothy McVeigh, originally from New York, and the Nichols brothers, 
originally from Michigan—which has been described as the worst incident of 
domestic terrorism in the United States); Frank Rich, Connect the Dots, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 30, 1995, at E15 (arguing that the domestic opposition to abortion clinics in the 
United States will join the Oklahoma City bombing in the chapter of the “history of 
home-grown American terrorism in the 1990’s”); see also Richard Lacayo, How Safe is 
Safe?  Americans Must Decide How Much Freedom They Are Willing To Trade For More 
Security, TIME, May 1, 1995, at 68 (describing how Americans are now coping with the 
real threat of domestic terrorism). 
 157. Infra note 219. 
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imports are more susceptible than equivalent domestic food products 
for use as bioterrorist agents,158 or that communication with foreign 
facilities in emergency situations would be significantly more 
problematic than similar domestic communication.159 
This mirrors the finding in EC-Hormones, where different levels of 
protection were applied based on a distinction between the intended 
purposes for administration of the hormone and whether the 
hormones present were naturally occurring or purposefully added.160  
                                                          
 158. The FDA is apparently most concerned with foreign food imports.  See 
Frederick Golden, What’s Next?  It Could Be Smallpox, Botulism, or Other Equally Deadly 
Biological Agents, TIME, Nov. 5, 2001, at 44 (relaying the concerns of then Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, about the susceptibility of the 
nation’s food supply to contamination, focusing on imports in particular).  If a 
bioterrorist attack is planned and carried out by a foreign bioterrorist, it is 
reasonable to assume that foreign food sources would be used because they are more 
accessible to the bioterrorist.  However, the events of September 11th proved that 
foreign terrorists often plan attacks from within a targeted nation’s border and 
utilize domestic resources.  See Kevin Sack & Jim Yardley, After the Attacks:  U.S. Says 
Hijackers Lived in the Open with Deadly Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at A1 
(reporting that several men suspected by the FBI to have carried out the September 
11th attacks received flight training at the Flight Safety Academy in Vero Beach, 
Florida); see also Joel Achenbach, ‘You Never Imagine’ A Hijacker Next Door, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 16, 2001, at A1 (detailing how some of the September 11th hijackers had lived 
in the United States for years prior to the attacks, seemingly “act[ing] like normal 
human beings, nothing abnormal”).  The implicit FDA assumption that foreign 
imports carry a greater bioterrorism risk must, therefore, be premised upon a belief 
that the United States faces terrorism primarily perpetrated by foreign individuals 
using foreign, not domestic, sources.  This is generally true given the United States’ 
most recent experience with terrorism.  Long-term, however, for both this country 
and most others, terrorist acts are carried out by dissent domestic groups. See 
Alexander, supra note 13, at 65-67 (describing both historical terrorism and 
contemporary terrorism, using examples from various regions of the world, as 
involving acts of domestic individuals uprising against a domestic government).  
Alexander explains that only recently has terrorism taken on an international 
dimension.  Id. at 66.  Additionally, the assumption that bioterrorists, as a particular 
subset of terrorists, are likely to be foreign individuals does not comport with the 
FDA’s experience with bioterrorism thus far.  See supra note 157 and accompanying 
text. 
 159. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,952 
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (requiring more 
complete emergency contact information from foreign food facilities because of past 
difficulties contacting facilities due to incomplete information in agency records).  
However, presuming that communication to foreign facilities broke down as a result 
of difficulties in reaching the actual facility, not in contacting the foreign embassy, 
the same communication difficulties would just transfer to the U.S. agent.  Id.  The 
FDA could achieve the same communications objective by holding foreign facilities 
to the domestic requirements—allowing them to designate an internal emergency 
contact on call twenty-four hours a day, with the added proviso that the contact be 
fluent in English.  This would eliminate any problems due to language barriers or 
time zone constraints. 
 160. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 218 (outlining five different levels of 
protection that the EC applied, as identified by the Panel). These levels of protection 
include: 
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Notably, the Appellate Body found the distinction maintained 
between the administration of growth hormones in cows, on the one 
hand, and the use of feed additives to enhance development in pigs, 
on the other hand, was “unjustifiable in the sense of Article 5.5.”161  
Both substances had carcinogenic characteristics, and were therefore 
potentially harmful to human life and health.162 
Similarly, there is no fundamental difference between a food 
product, such as an apple, that is grown domestically and shipped 
within the United States and one that is produced internationally and 
shipped into the United States.  The only distinguishing 
characteristic of the apples is the country of origin.163  Because both 
apples have virtually identical composition, each is equally susceptible 
to biological contamination.  Thus, similar to the finding in EC-
Hormones, the maintenance of different levels of protection under 
Title III is not rationally justified, but rather arbitrary. 
Additionally, Title III’s arbitrary imposition of different levels of 
protection discriminates against foreign industry and discourages 
trade.  Despite its recognition of an arbitrary distinction, the 
Appellate Body in EC-Hormones determined that the EC’s prohibition 
of growth hormones was not discriminatory because it applied equally 
                                                          
• the level of protection in respect of natural hormones when used 
for growth promotion; 
• the level of protection in respect of natural hormones occurring 
endogenously [or naturally] in meat and other foods; 
• the level of protection in respect of natural hormones when used 
for therapeutic or zootechnical purposes; 
• the levels of protection in respect of synthetic . . . hormones when 
used for growth promotes; and 
• the level of protection in response of carbadox and olaquindox. 
Id. 
 161. Id. ¶ 235. 
 162. See id. ¶¶ 226-235 (highlighting the parallel “genotoxic” and carcinogenic 
nature of carbadox, olaquindox and growth hormones and rejecting the EC’s various 
attempts to distinguish these substances or prove a justifiable distinction).  The Panel 
found an arbitrary distinction between the maintenance of different standards for 
artificially injected hormones and naturally-occurring hormones, which the 
Appellate Body explicitly overturned.  Id. ¶ 220.  Unlike the Panel, the Appellate 
Body concluded there was a fundamental distinction between natural and synthetic 
hormones and stressed that the regulation of all naturally occurring hormones, 
present in virtually every animal producing subsequent meat products, would require 
an “absurd” level of administrative oversight.  Id. ¶ 221 (describing that the oversight 
would “entail[] such a comprehensive and massive governmental intervention in 
nature” that it would impede upon the everyday, ordinary lives of the people).  With 
respect to hormones administered for growth promotion purposes and therapeutic 
or zootechincal purposes, the Appellate Body held that there existed also an 
inherent and justifiable difference between these administration purposes.  Id. 
¶¶ 223-225. 
 163. Cf. infra note 219 and accompanying text (arguing that a distinction based on 
country of origin is unjustified). 
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to beef produced within the European Union and beef imports.164  
With respect to Title III, however, the different levels of protection 
are applied only according to the origin of the food product.  This 
substantial difference in levels of protection demonstrates plain 
discrimination.165  This discrimination, in turn, restricts trade by 
creating considerable costs for foreign exporters.166  Therefore, Title 
III violates Articles 2.3 and 5.5 because it arbitrarily and unjustifiably 
discriminates against foreign industry and restricts international 
trade. 
2. Title III is not based on a proper risk assessment under Article 5.1 
Despite repeated demands for a risk assessment to support the 
Bioterrorism Act,167 neither the United States nor the FDA has made 
such an assessment available for the purposes of the SPS 
                                                          
 164. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 244-246 (concluding that the Panel erred 
in determining that there was an arbitrary or unjustifiable difference in the levels of 
EC protection that resulted in discrimination on foreign industry). 
 165. See Report of the Appellate Body, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 18-31, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) (exploring the 
different levels of taxation imposed on domestic and imported products and 
arguing, based on a parallel provision of the GATT, that significant differences in 
levels of protection may be sufficient to result in discrimination on trade); cf. EC-
Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 236 (considering and rejecting the Panel’s conclusion, 
based on Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, that different protection alone may 
prove discrimination under the SPS Agreement, but acknowledging that it is still an 
important factor).  Indeed, this may have been the most important factor considered 
in EC-Hormones.  See Victor, supra note 35, at 903 (reviewing the Appellate Body’s 
findings with respect to the discrimination principle and arguing that the third 
factor, whether an arbitrary difference in protection harmed trade, was most relevant 
considering the SPS Agreement’s objective to reduce trade barriers). 
 166. See supra Part II.A (concluding that Title III has an adverse impact on 
international trade because it imposes considerable costs on foreign facilities alone); 
see also supra notes 120, 124 (explaining the difference between the total cost of 
foreign compliance with registration and the separate cost for the U.S. agent 
requirement and providing an estimate of total annual costs to comply with 
registration and prior notice).  Compare Establishment and Maintenance of Records 
Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,562, 71,612, tbl.1 (Dec. 9, 2004)  (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pts. 1, 11) (predicting recurring annual costs on domestic facilities for records 
maintenance, in addition to normal business recordkeeping, at $123 million), with 
Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974, 59,046, tbl.25 (Oct. 10, 
2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule) (forecasting recurring annual 
costs of $260 million on foreign facilities for prior notice; thus demonstrating that 
prior notice is more than twice as costly as the domestic records maintenance 
requirement). 
 167. See, e.g., European Commission, Comments of the European Commission on 
implementing rule of US Bioterrorism Act, Registration of Food Facilities, Apr. 4, 
2003, at 1, http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/trade/reg_food_fac_en.pdf 
(“The U.S. should provide such a risk assessment as requested by the SPS Agreement 
to both justify the proposed measure and ensure that any potential risks are 
addressed in an effective and proportionate manner.”). 
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Agreement.168  The importance of a valid, supportive risk assessment 
cannot be overstated.  All four cases disputed under the SPS 
Agreement focused on the need for, and the lack of, a proper risk 
assessment in finding against the domestic legislation under 
consideration.169 
The FDA has published a risk assessment concerning food 
terrorism.170  However, the purpose of this assessment is to 
communicate the risk of foodborne illness from acts of food 
terrorism and incidents of unintentional contamination to the 
American public, not to comply with the SPS Agreement.171  Thus, the 
United States has failed to comply with Article 5 of the SPS 
Agreement because it has produced no specific risk assessment, or, to 
public knowledge, performed an assessment,172 for the express 
purpose of supporting the Bioterrorism Act.173 
                                                          
 168. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5.8 (requiring WTO members to 
respond to requests for justification of trade restrictive measures by providing 
supportive risk assessments). 
 169. See Japan–Apples, supra note 22, ¶¶ 189-216, 243(d) (discussing arguments 
that Japan violated Article 5.1 and concluding that the analysis presented by Japan 
failed to satisfy the definition of “risk assessment” established in Annex A, paragraph 
4 of the SPS Agreement); Japan–Testing, supra note 88, ¶¶ 109-117, 143(f) (evaluating 
arguments that Japan’s testing requirement for certain fruits (apricots, pears, plums, 
and quinces) violated Article 5.1 and finding the measure was not based on a risk 
assessment, therefore breaching the SPS Agreement); Australia–Salmon, supra note 
85, ¶¶ 42-54, 112-178, 279(c)-(d) (reviewing claims that Australia’s salmon import 
violated Article 5.1 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement and finding that Australia 
breached both Articles due to the lack of proper risk assessment); EC-Hormones, supra 
note 25, ¶¶ 82-96, 178-246, 253 (considering the Panel’s finding that the EC had 
violated numerous provisions of Article 5 and ultimately deciding that the EC 
violated only Article 5.1 because its measure was not substantively based on a risk 
assessment of hormone-treated beef); see also Davey, supra note 90, at 92 (stating that 
“the major issue in SPS cases so far has been a failure to conduct a risk assessment or 
base a measure on the assessment”). 
 170. See Risk Assessment for Food Terrorism and Other Food Safety Concerns, 68 
Fed. Reg. 59,078 (Oct. 10, 2003) (notice) (announcing the availability of the FDA 
Risk Assessment concerning food terrorism in an effort to inform the public and 
improve the Agency’s “ability to prevent, prepare for, and respond to an incident of 
food sabotage”). 
 171. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. I (stating that the purpose of the 
FDA Risk Assessment is to educate the public of the risks inherent in acts of food 
terrorism). 
 172. But see Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,952 
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (stating that the 
FDA commissioned two threat assessments, one by the Batelle Memorial Institute 
and a second by the Institute of Food Technologists, to evaluate the vulnerability of 
the U.S. food supply).  However, the results of these assessments are classified.  Id.  
As such, neither has been made available to the public, nor submitted in support of 
Title III’s compliance with the SPS Agreement. 
 173. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5 (describing the need for a risk 
assessment to determine that a member’s adopted level of protection is appropriate); 
see also EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 190 (explaining that Article 5.1 does not insist 
that a member carry out its own risk assessment, only that a measure be based on 
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Assuming arguendo that the FDA Risk Assessment is offered for the 
purposes of the SPS Agreement, it is still not sufficient to support 
Title III.  The assessment is too redacted to provide useful 
information or inform an independent review of the threat of 
bioterrorism,174 and it addresses the broad category of food 
contamination without adequate focus on the specific incident of 
food bioterrorism.175  More significantly, it fails by the letter of Article 
5 to fulfill the procedural and substantive requirements of a 
supportive risk assessment.  Finally, it is possible that no risk 
assessment could adequately support Title III as currently 
implemented because Title III’s ability to provide sufficient 
protection against bioterrorism is weakened by the number of direct-
to-consumer food sources that are exempted from the regulation.176 
a. General deficiencies of the FDA Risk Assessment 
The FDA Risk Assessment is generally deficient as an evaluation of 
the risk of bioterrorism because it fails to address the particular 
threat or effect of intentional food contamination.177  The FDA relies 
primarily upon classified information to evaluate the vulnerability of 
the food supply and the risk of bioterrorism, leaving many aspects of 
its analysis obscurely unexplained.178  While the Agency identifies 
                                                          
some risk assessment, and that a measure “might well find its objective justification in 
a risk assessment carried out by another Member, or an international organization”).  
The requirements that the measure be “based on” a risk assessment, and that a 
member must produce an assessment to justify a disputed measure under Article 5.8 
remain regardless of who performs the assessment.  See infra notes 199-201 and 
accompanying text (concluding that Title III is not “based on” any published risk 
assessment available; thus, the United States has violated Article 5.1). 
 174. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13 pt. I, ¶ 5 (“This Risk Assessment uses 
scientific evidence on food terrorism to the extent that it exists and is available, but 
balances this disclosure with the need to maintain the integrity of classified 
information.”).  This paragraph goes on to note that the assessment is based “solely 
on unclassified information.”  Id. 
 175. See, e.g., id. at pt. II.B (analyzing the likely magnitude of the risk, in terms of 
severity and duration of effect, by equating accidental and deliberate contamination 
and relying on reports of the spread of foodborne disease caused by unintentional 
contamination). 
 176. See infra Part II.B.2.c. 
 177. See EC-Hormones, ¶¶ 182-184 (interpreting the treaty definition of a risk 
assessment to require a two-step process, as laid out in paragraph four of Annex A of 
the SPS Agreement).  This process requires a risk assessment to first “identify the 
adverse effects on human health (if any) arising from the [specific risk at issue]” and “if 
any such adverse effects exists, evaluate the potential or probability of occurrence of 
such effects.”  Id. ¶¶ 183-184 (alteration in original). 
 178. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. I (disclosing at the outset that the 
assessments performed by the FDA to assess the risk of food terrorism are largely 
classified in nature); see also supra text accompanying note 174. 
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biological agents that could be used as bioterrorist weapons,179 and 
suggests the threat to the U.S. food supply is “more than 
theoretical,”180 it also admits the difficulty of predicting with any 
certainty the likelihood that a bioterrorist attack will actually occur.181 
Understandably, no one is able to predict precisely the threat of 
bioterrorism.  Indeed, as a precautionary measure, other nations have 
reported heightened states of alert for biological attacks via air, food, 
or water.182  However, if the FDA possesses information that more 
specifically identifies the bioterrorism threat to the food supply, such 
materials should be made available in a more detailed and 
transparent assessment to other WTO members.183 
In addition, the FDA relies heavily on reports of foodborne disease 
caused by unintentional contamination to demonstrate the potential 
reach of food outbreaks,184 but fails to identify the consequences of a 
                                                          
 179. See, e.g., FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.A (listing Bacillus anthracis 
(anthrax) and Clostridium botulinum (botulism) as deadly Category A agents, which 
are high-priority agents because of their potential impact on human life and health). 
 180. Id. pt. II.C, ¶ 5; see id. at pt. II.C, ¶¶ 6-7 (documenting some unclassified 
reports of terrorist organizations’ attempts to acquire biological materials, such as a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) report that documents recovered in 
Afghanistan mentioned the use of nicotine and solanine, two naturally occurring 
toxins, as poisons in terrorist activities); see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., TERRORIST 
THREATS TO FOOD:  GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING AND STRENGTHENING PREVENTION AND 
RESPONSE SYSTEMS 1 (2002) (warning that “[t]he malicious contamination of food for 
terrorist purposes is a real and current threat”). 
 181. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.C, ¶ 2 (noting that “it is 
difficult for FDA to predict with any certainty the likelihood that an act of food 
terrorism will occur”); see also Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 
58,894, 58,952 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) 
(describing that because the probability of a bioterrorist attack occurring and the 
exact reduction of risk as a result of the new registration provisions is unknown, the 
FDA has analogized to past outbreaks resulting from domestic incidents of accidental 
and intentional food contamination to illustrate the cost of foodborne public health 
emergencies); Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974, 59,064 
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule) (admitting that 
because the FDA “lacks data to estimate the likelihood of a strike occurring,” the 
agency again used a comparison to the risk associated with accidentally contaminated 
imported foods). 
 182. WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 180, at 2. 
 183. If the U.S. government does disclose other classified information that was 
used as the basis for the FDA Risk Assessment, or another assessment otherwise 
supporting Title III, this Comment’s analysis that the United States violated Article 
5.1, infra Part II.B.2.b, could change, as classified information may tend to show that 
the measure is in fact amply supported.  Without such information, however, and in 
light of the fact that the U.S. has not yet provided any information of a risk 
assessment despite many requests from international trading partners, this 
Comment’s current analysis holds true. 
 184. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pts. II.B-D (assessing the effect, 
exposure, and risk of a successful bioterrorist attack by analogizing to unintentional 
food contamination, instead of providing information pertaining specifically to 
intentional contamination); see also supra note 181 (describing how the FDA 
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successful and intentional food attack.185  Although “risk assessments 
need not be based entirely on research in the physical sciences[,] 
nor . . . examine only quantitative risks,”186 an assessment must be 
applied to the particular risk that the disputed sanitary measure is 
designed to prevent.187  The FDA Risk Assessment, which does not 
provide an analysis of the effect a specifically targeted bioterrorism 
attack would have on the food supply, is lacking in this respect. 
b. The FDA Risk Assessment fails to satisfy the procedural and 
substantive requirements of Article 5.1 and does not demonstrate 
reasonable support for Title III 
In addition to these general problems, the FDA Risk Assessment 
also fails to satisfy the specific procedural and substantive 
requirements of Article 5.1.  The Appellate Body in EC-Hormone 
derived a procedural and substantive requirement from two 
important words in Article 5.1: “Members shall ensure that their 
sanitary . . . measures are based on a[] [risk] assessment. . . .”188 
The procedural element requires that a member initially obtain a 
risk assessment, which serves as the basis for an enacted measure.189  
The EC-Hormones Panel construed the term “based on” to establish a 
“minimum procedural requirement” that a member actually “took 
into account”190 certain studies and assessments in forming the 
measure in dispute.191  While the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones 
                                                          
analogizes to events of unintentional contamination to assess the risks of 
bioterrorism and the costs of the new regulations, under both registration and prior 
notice interim rules). 
 185. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.B (describing illness and death, 
economic effects, and sociological and political implications such as public fear and 
anxiety as the consequences of accidental food outbreaks, but failing to account for 
any consequences of intentional contamination). 
 186. See Victor, supra note 35, at 901 (highlighting that the Appellate Body in EC-
Hormones stressed that risk assessments need not be fully and completely supported 
by scientific information). 
 187. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 204-209 (emphasizing that a risk 
assessment must support the specific risk targeted in the domestic measure at issue, 
and finding that because the EC risk assessments only generally addressed the risk of 
growth hormones without specifically addressing the risk of improper administration 
of hormones (the impetus of the EC ban), the EC measure was not supported). 
 188. See id. ¶ 179 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting SPS 
Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5.1). 
 189. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5.1 (listing the basic risk assessment 
principle); see also EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 188-191 (discussing the procedural 
requirement of Article 5.1); supra note 85 and accompanying text (explaining Article 
5 in detail). 
 190. EC-Hormones, Complaint by Canada, supra note 93, ¶ 8.116; EC-Hormones, 
Complaint by the United States, supra note 97, ¶ 8.113. 
 191. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 188-189 (relaying and discarding the 
Panel’s textual interpretations of Article 5). 
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rejected the Panel’s textual construction,192 it embraced the Panel’s 
underlying legal reasoning.193  The Appellate Body re-affirmed that 
the term “based on” requires that a member, at a minimum, obtain a 
risk assessment that forms the basis for the disputed measure.194 
Next, the assessment must substantively support the measure.195  
This substantive element involves a two part inquiry:  first, an 
examination of the scientific conclusions reached in the assessment 
and implicit in the enacted measure and, second, an evaluation of 
the relationship between the two sets of scientific conclusions.196  
Ultimately, the risk assessment must demonstrate reasonable support 
for the disputed measure.197  Thus, “there is not only a procedural 
requirement to obtain a risk assessment,” but also a “‘substantive 
requirement that there be a rational relationship between the measure 
and the risk assessment.’”198 
Title III is not procedurally “based on” the FDA Risk Assessment.  
The Bioterrorism Act was enacted on June 12, 2002, well before the 
publication of this assessment.199  Furthermore, nothing in the Act 
acknowledges the FDA Risk Assessment, or any other risk assessment, 
in support of the measure.200  It is also unclear how the FDA Risk 
Assessment may have shaped the registration or prior notice 
regulations implementing Title III, which were published 
                                                          
 192. See id. ¶ 189 (preferring to retain the language specifically used in the 
Agreement to remain consistent with the principle of plain language interpretation, 
rather than adopt the “take into account” language employed by the Panel, for which 
no textual basis exists in Article 5). 
 193. Id. (rejecting the Panel’s textual interpretations, but rearticulating the 
Panel’s basic legal argument that there is an inherent procedural requirement in 
Article 5). 
 194. Id. (announcing the term “based on” compels a “certain objective 
relationship . . . that persists and is observable between an SPS measure and a risk 
assessment”). 
 195. See id. ¶ 193 (requiring that the results of the obtained risk assessment also 
“reasonably support” the measure as a substantive matter). 
 196. SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5.1; see EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 192-
209 (explaining the substantive requirement of Article 5.1). 
 197. EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 193. 
 198. Victor, supra note 35, at 901 (quoting, in part, EC-Hormones, supra note 25, 
¶ 193). 
 199. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, pmbl., 116 Stat. 594, 594 (noting the date of enactment 
as June 12, 2002). 
 200. See id. (failing to mention any supportive risk assessment or other scientific 
study to justify the legislative act); see also EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 191 (pointing 
out that preambles of legislative acts or administrative regulations commonly fulfill 
requirements of WTO members, such as identifying scientific support for a measure 
under the SPS Agreement).  The Appellate Body does acknowledge, however, that 
the absence of reference to a scientific study is not dispositive proof that no scientific 
support exists because such preambles are not a requirement of any WTO 
Agreement, including the SPS Agreement.  EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 191. 
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simultaneously with the FDA Risk Assessment.201  Therefore, the FDA 
Risk Assessment could not logically have formed the basis for Title III 
because it was published after the Act’s passage and simultaneously 
with the implementation of the regulations.202 
Title III is also not substantively “based on” the FDA Risk 
Assessment because the scientific conclusions contained in the risk 
assessment fail to justify the conclusions implicit in the regulation.  
The FDA Risk Assessment concludes that there is a hazard that deadly 
pathogens could be used as bioterrorist agents203 and that a successful 
attack could impact human life and the nation’s economic vitality or 
cause sociological and political ramifications.204  The assessment 
repeatedly stresses the uncertain nature of bioterrorism and 
correspondingly, the Agency’s inability to fully assess the threat of 
                                                          
 201. See supra notes 7, 17, 170 (listing October 10, 2003 as the date of notification 
in the Federal Register of the availability of the FDA Risk Assessment, as well as the 
publication date for the FDA interim rules on registration and prior notice, 
respectively). 
 202. This argument assumes that the FDA Risk Assessment is the only assessment 
FDA or Congress could have consulted in the formation of Title III and its 
regulations.  This assumption is warranted because as of yet, no other risk assessment 
has been identified by either party.  However, it is important to note, as the Appellate 
Body did, that Article 5 does not require that the member in question have 
performed the risk assessment upon which the measure is based.  Instead, the 
member must clearly offer any designated, “substitute” risk assessment in support of 
its measure.  EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶¶ 41, 190; see supra text accompanying 
note 173. 
 203. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.A, ¶ 1-2 (describing activities of 
the CDC, even before the 2001 anthrax attacks, to identify and rank several food 
pathogens as critical agents for possible terrorist attacks, among which anthrax and 
botulism ranked as “Category A” high-priority substances).  However, the assessment 
further notes that the majority of biological agents identified by the CDC were 
classified as “Category B” agents because they are moderately easy to disseminate and 
cause moderate to low morbidity, which is the ratio of observable deaths to total 
population.  Id. 
 204. See Joseph A. Levitt, CFSAN’s Program Priorities:  From Food Safety to Food Security, 
58 FOOD DRUG L.J. 19, 20 (2003) (cautioning that if a bioterrorist attack is successful, 
“the result could be significant morbidity and mortality [human health effects] as 
well as significant economic loss”); see also FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. 
II.B.1 (considering the possible impact of bioterrorism on human life and health by 
using CDC data documenting the annual effect of accidental contamination in the 
United States at 76,000,000 illnesses, 325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths); id. 
pt. II.B.2 (describing at least three types of economic effects generated by food 
terrorism:  direct economic loss from the cost of response, indirect effects suffered by 
industry, and international ramifications, such as trade embargoes or other trade 
reactions to contaminated U.S. products); id. pt. II.B.3 (highlighting the potential 
social impact of bioterrorism as parallel to the public hysteria experienced in the 
United States when Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (“BSE”) or “mad cow 
disease” was discovered in British cattle in the late 1980s).  The assessment also 
explains that societal fears and anxieties produced by such an event could reduce 
confidence in the political system and governing bodies or result in political 
destabilization, as was experienced by Great Britain during the mad cow crisis.  Id. 
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future attacks.205  However, the FDA documents some evidence of 
terrorist plans to acquire biological contaminants206 and notes the 
“unique susceptibility” of food products generally.207  Implicit in Title 
III and its implementing regulations are three conclusions:  
(1) increased oversight of food suppliers can deter deliberate food 
contamination;208 (2) advanced notice of the entry of foreign foods 
into the United States will enable the FDA to investigate reported 
threats;209 and (3) increased avenues of communication can reduce 
the spread of any successful attack.210 
The fatal flaw of the FDA Risk Assessment is that it fails to 
demonstrate reasonable support for Title III or show that the 
measure is substantively “based on” the assessment’s scientific 
                                                          
 205. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.C (acknowledging that 
uncertainty must factor into the risk assessment); see also supra note 181 and 
accompanying text (describing repeated instances where the FDA admits it lacks the 
information and capability to fully assess the threat, likelihood, or magnitude of a 
bioterrorism attack). 
 206. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.C (pointing out the seizure of 
U.S. agricultural documents that had been translated into Arabic from an Al Qaeda 
location in Afghanistan, and a report from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency that 
in 2003, the British investigated a suspected Al Qaeda plot to poison their troops’ 
food supplies). 
 207. See id. at pt. II.C, ¶ 4 (relying on information from CDC experts that 
describes how the relative centralization of food production in the United States, and 
the distribution of food products on a global scale, creates a vulnerability in the food 
supply to wide-scale sabotage). 
 208. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,951-52 
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (listing the 
FDA’s expectation that registration will deter bioterrorists by making their activities 
traceable). 
 209. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974, 59,064 
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1) (interim rule) (presuming that 
increased information about imported foods will help the FDA match bioterrorism 
intelligence to imported food shipments and therefore enhance containment of 
food products that are in fact adulterated at port); see also Matthew T. McGrath & 
Cortney O’Toole Morgan, Business Regulation:  Customs Law, 37 INT’L LAW. 245, 253-
54 (2003) (describing how the Prior Notice of Imported Food rule provides the FDA 
with increased inspection authority). 
 210. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,952 
(expecting that updated registration contact information and the specific 
designation of a U.S. agent will accelerate the FDA’s communication with food 
facilities post-incident, so that the effects of a potential bioterrorist attack could be 
contained through quick, coordinated agency and facility reaction to the outbreak); 
see also Levitt, supra note 204, at 24 (stressing the need for improved communication 
and coordination to limit biological contamination’s effects and praising Title III’s 
registration provisions that allow the FDA to quickly conduct trace-back 
investigations to map out the contamination route). 
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conclusions.211  This mirrors the specific finding in EC-Hormones.212  
Although the EC submitted various risk assessments in support of its 
measure, the scientific conclusions contained therein revealed that 
the banned growth hormones generally did not pose a threat to 
human life or health.213  Accordingly, the Appellate Body concluded 
that the EC import ban was not warranted.214  Similarly, nothing in 
FDA’s Risk Assessment establishes that requiring foreign importers to 
provide prior notice before importing food into the United States, or 
to designate a U.S. agent, will protect human life or health from 
potential acts of bioterrorism.215 
There are two reasons why the FDA Risk Assessment substantively 
fails to provide reasonable support for Title III.  First, it is far too 
broad in scope.  All food, from both domestic and foreign sources, 
and all types of contamination, both accidental and deliberate, are 
lumped together,216 despite the fact that intentional contamination is 
a distinct danger.217  Title III unilaterally imposes increased regulation 
on foreign imports, but the assessment fails to sufficiently 
                                                          
 211. See infra notes 217-227 and accompanying text (arguing that there is no 
rational relationship between the FDA Risk Assessment and Title III and its 
regulations, and explaining why the assessment fails the substantive requirement). 
 212. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 208 (concluding that “no risk assessment . . . 
reasonably supports or warrants” the EC import prohibition). 
 213. See id. ¶ 206 (concluding that most if not all of the scientific studies referred 
to the Panel by the EC found that the use of the banned hormones for growth 
promotion in animals was safe); see also Victor, supra note 35, at 899 (declaring that 
“[u]nfortunate for the EC’s position, however, was the fact that every risk assessment 
of these hormones had shown that growth hormones applied according to good 
veterinary practices would result in no significant harm to humans,” including at 
least two reviews commissioned by the EC itself). 
 214. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 207 (reviewing the EC’s scientific reports 
and data and concurring with the Panel decision that this evidence presented a 
“theoretical framework” for the analysis of the effect of growth hormones, but did 
not “investigate and evaluate” the actual problems the EC claimed to be 
experiencing as a result of hormone-treated meat). 
 215. See supra notes 208-09. 
 216. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.B (analyzing all types of 
contamination, including some deliberate acts, as well as data from accidental 
outbreaks originating from domestic and foreign sources to assess the risk of 
bioterrorism). 
 217. Bioterrorism, by definition, is specifically targeted to cause maximum human 
casualties and thus can be significantly different from accidental food outbreaks in 
terms of exposure and spread of the contamination.  See Registration of Food 
Facilities Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,952 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 
21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (admitting that an intentional attack on the food 
supply would probably be significantly more costly, and sicken many more U.S. 
citizens, than an act of accidental food contamination).  But see FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, 
supra note 13, pt. II.B, ¶ 1 (defending the analogy to unintentional contamination, 
calling attention to the similarities between the two forms of contamination, and 
describing the risk to consumers as “comparable, regardless of whether the 
contamination was deliberate or accidental”). 
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demonstrate that imported foods carry a higher risk of use in 
biological attacks or are more susceptible to deliberate 
contamination.218  In fact, the exact opposite appears to be true.  Past 
incidents of food bioterrorism in the United States, targeted at 
Americans themselves or specific American food sources, have all 
been perpetrated by individuals living in the country and using 
domestic food sources.219 
A risk assessment must evaluate the specific risk mitigated by the 
establishment of the sanitary measure; it should not simply 
demonstrate a cognizable threat.220  The EC hormone ban was 
rejected because its risk assessments considered only the general 
effects of hormone use, without appropriate focus on the six banned 
hormones or the hormones’ potential to negatively affect meat 
products in particular.221  In similar fashion, the FDA Risk Assessment 
pertains to the entire category of food contamination, without 
appropriate concentration on the actual threat of purposeful, 
biological contamination of imported food products.222 
                                                          
 218. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.A (characterizing the risk of 
certain biological agents, but failing to identify any distinction between the threat of 
bioterrorism attempted on domestic versus foreign food products). 
 219. See Hodge, supra note 2, at 255 (reciting past incidents of bioterrorism, which 
were all domestic incidents).  Hodge describes bioterrorism events dating back to the 
American colonial period, when British and French troops exchanged dry goods 
intentionally contaminated with smallpox with Native Americans.  He also lists two 
major bioterrorism attempts on U.S. soil in the late twentieth century:  a foiled plot 
to poison water supplies in Midwestern cities with typhoid bacteria, resulting in the 
arrests of several Chicago citizens; and the 1982 contamination of local salad bars 
with salmonella to disrupt a local Oregon election.  Id.  In closing, Hodge notes that 
the FBI, the federal agency responsible for, inter alia, investigations of domestic 
threats of terrorism, has investigated hundreds of claims of bioterrorism threats in 
the years after the 2001 anthrax attacks.  Id.  Note, however, that each of these 
attacks occurred by domestic persons who used domestic food products already in the 
United States.  Id.; see FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pts. I-II.A (listing past acts 
of domestic deliberate food contamination, including those reported in the Hodge 
article, but failing to identify any past acts of deliberate food contamination 
originating from foreign sources); cf. Alexander, supra note 13, at 81-82 (describing 
the endeavors of the Aum Shinrikyo Japanese cult to release numerous biological 
and chemical agents on the people of Japan over the last thirty years, including a 
highly publicized successful attack on the Tokyo subway system using the nerve gas 
sarin, thus revealing that other countries grappling with bioterrorism concerns also 
face a demonstrated risk from domestic persons using domestic means of attack). 
 220. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 203 (stating that the risks articulated by the 
EC did not address the specific substances at issue because they merely pronounced 
general problems with control over the hormones, and finding that the EC’s 
articulated risks were insufficient to show that the hormones in dispute actually 
posed a real threat to human life and health). 
 221. Id. ¶ 199 (noting that the EC risk assessments applied to entire categories of 
hormones, rather than narrow application to the specific risk of growth hormones 
and that the assessments further failed to evaluate the carcinogenic effects of 
hormones in food, specifically meat products). 
 222. FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. I. 
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Second, the scientific conclusions implicit in Title III and the 
FDA’s regulations focus on the need for increased communication, 
whereas the conclusions derived from the FDA Risk Assessment 
support increased controls on biological agents, but not post-attack 
response mechanisms.223  The FDA document contains no specific 
assessment of the magnitude, effect, or potential reach of a 
bioterrorist attack,224 yet Title III purports to minimize the risk of 
bioterrorism by reducing the spread of an outbreak.225  Because the 
risk assessment fails to explore the effect or potential spread of a 
deliberate food attack, it likewise fails to justify responsive measures.226  
This is comparable to the EC-Hormones finding that the EC’s 
responsive measure to prevent the consumption of harmful growth 
hormones was not scientifically justified because its risk assessments 
failed to consider the particular risk in the administration of the 
banned growth hormones in cattle and instead, merely asserted 
generalized claims of the hormones’ carcinogenic properties.227  In 
conclusion, because Title III is neither procedurally nor substantively 
“based on” the FDA Risk Assessment, it violates Article 5.1 of the SPS 
Agreement.228 
                                                          
 223. Compare id. pt. II.A (characterizing the likelihood of bioterrorist targeting of 
certain biological agents as weapons), with Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, tit. 2, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.A., 18 U.S.C.A., 21 U.S.C.A., 
and 42 U.S.C.A. (West 2006) (increasing federal controls over biological agents).  
Title II of the Bioterrorism Act is clearly warranted by the scientific findings in the 
FDA Risk Assessment, which demonstrate that certain biological agents are in fact 
very harmful to human life and health, namely, anthrax and botulism, which are 
identified in the FDA Risk Assessment as “Category A” agents, and supplies of such 
toxins should be properly protected).  FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.A. 
 224. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.B (characterizing the 
magnitude of the risk based on unintentional contamination only). 
 225. See supra text accompanying note 46 (listing the communication benefits of 
registration and how they are designed to limit the effective spread of 
biocontaminants). 
 226. See FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, pt. II.B (limiting the assessment 
explicitly to unintentional food contamination). 
 227. See EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 200 (holding that the studies, articles, and 
opinions submitted by the EC failed to address the particular risk at stake, as 
required by paragraph four in the Annex of the SPS Agreement, which describes the 
purpose of a risk assessment and what it should achieve); see also supra note 85 
(detailing the SPS Agreement requirements in Annex A). 
 228. Cf. EC-Hormones, supra note 25, ¶ 209 (concluding that the EC violated Article 
5.1 and finding that because the import ban was more stringent than the relevant 
international standard, and as a result of the interrelation between the 
harmonization and risk assessment principles, the EC measure was also inconsistent 
with Article 3.3 (harmonization) by failing to comply with Article 5.1.).  Compare 
this to the above finding that Title III violates Article 5.1 and the inference that, by 
implication, Title III thus violates Article 3.3.  Consider also the author’s assessment 
that Title III independently violates the harmonization principle.  Supra note 133 
and accompanying text. 
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c. Title III exempts a number of significant food sources and fails to     
achieve its stated level of bioterrorism protection 
Although most domestic and foreign facilities are required to 
register with the FDA, Title III exempts a large number of domestic 
direct food-to-consumer sources from registration that would have 
equal, if not greater, adverse impacts on the food supply if 
deliberately contaminated.229  While practical for other regulatory 
purposes, these exemptions critically undermine the Act’s overall 
ability to achieve bioterrorism protection, especially with regard to its 
goal of deterrence.230  Most importantly, these exemptions make the 
possibility of conformity to Article 5 even more unfeasible because no 
risk assessment can support imposition of the measure if the sanitary 
measure will not achieve its stated level of protection.231 
Title III excludes over two million American farms232 from 
registering with the FDA,233 any of which would each make an easy 
target for bioterrorists.234  While subsequent food processing would 
                                                          
 229. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d(b)(1) (West 2006) (describing that the term “facility” 
does not include:  “farms; restaurants; other retail food establishments; nonprofit 
food establishments in which food is prepared for or served directly to the consumer; 
or fishing vessels”); FDA Registration of Food Facilities, 21 C.F.R. § 1.226 (2006) 
(explaining which facilities are not required to register with the FDA); see also supra 
note 43 and accompanying text (describing the above, and other, exemptions from 
registration requirements). 
 230. See Lovett, supra note 3, at 477-81 (claiming that the Bioterrorism Act 
“curiously exempts” multiple facilities in which foods are prepared for or served 
directly to the consumer with little explanation or justification).  Lovett hypothesizes 
that terrorist groups could easily tamper with food in these exempted establishments 
all over the country and create havoc in the food supply.  Id. 
 231. See SPS Agreement, supra note 19, art. 5.  A risk assessment must explain the 
reasons for a sanitary measure designed to achieve a given level of protection.  See id. 
art. 5.8.  If, however, flaws in the application or coverage of the sanitary measure 
mean that it will not achieve that level, a risk assessment purportedly supporting the 
measure will also fail.  This is because a risk assessment cannot support what the 
measure cannot do; that is, if the exemptions to Title III so critically weaken the 
assessment’s ability to provide protection from the risk of intentional food 
contamination, no risk assessment submitted in support of Title III can demonstrate 
that it will, in fact, protect against bioterrorism. Id. 
 232. See United States Department of Agriculture Homepage, Data and Statistics, 
http://www.nass.usda.gov/Census/Create_Census_US.jsp (in “Step 2,” select “Farms 
(number);” in “Step 3,” select “All States, United States;” click “Add;” click “Get 
Data”) (last visited Nov. 10, 2006) (documenting the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s account of the total farms in the United States, per 2002 census data, at 
approximately 2,100,900). 
 233. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d(b)(1) (exempting farms from registration). 
 234. See Radford B. Davis, Agroterrorism:  Need for Awareness, in PERSPECTIVES IN 
WORLD FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 353-416 (Colin G. Scanes & John A. Miranowski eds., 
2004), available at http://www.actionbioscience.org/newfrontiers/davis.html 
(describing agriculture as the “perfect target” for bioterrorists, also called 
agroterrorism).  Radford explains that the agriculture industry is unmatched in 
revenue and scope, as more than twenty-four million Americans are employed 
directly in the agriculture industry and food accounts for over thirteen percent of the 
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likely limit the effects of deliberate contamination of farm animals or 
crops, accidental foodborne diseases from farm products have 
severely impacted human health and the vitality of the U.S. food 
market in the past.235  Despite the fact that forty percent of Americans 
eat two to three meals weekly at restaurants and fast food 
establishments,236 Title III also exempts restaurants and other retail 
establishments.237  Since these types of establishments are generally a 
responsibility of the states,238 Congress may have lacked jurisdiction to 
regulate them, or determined that their registration was unnecessary 
to the effectiveness of the Act.239  There is, however, no assurance that 
the food supply is fully safe from bioterrorism while the Bioterrorism 
Act exempts from its protective measures facilities that deliver food 
directly to American consumers. 
In light of these significant exemptions, which weaken the 
Bioterrorism Act’s protective purpose, Title III may never be 
supported as a valid sanitary measure under the SPS Agreement.  
Article 5 requires a risk assessment to show that a sanitary measure is 
necessary to achieve the level of protection deemed appropriate by a 
certain member, in this case protection against intentionally 
contaminated foods.240  Here, gaping holes in the application of Title 
                                                          
U.S. Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”), one measurement of the size of an economy.  
As the United States is a world leader in food production, if any one of its major food 
products, including corn, soy, cattle, or poultry, were significantly affected by a 
bioterrorist act, the result could be “catastrophic.”  Consequently, agroterrorism 
should not only concern the farmer, but also businesses such as suppliers, 
transporters, grocery stores, or restaurants, as well as the end consumer, who could 
all expect to suffer from bioterrorism’s effects.  Id. 
 235. See, e.g., FDA RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 13,, pt. II.B.1, ¶ 3 (detailing how 
one of the largest reported food outbreaks involved unintentional biological 
contamination of milk with Salmonella typhimurium, during the pasteurization process 
at a farm facility that resulted in the hospitalization of nearly 170,000 Americans). 
 236. See How and Where America Eats, CBS Poll, Nov. 20, 2005, http://www.cbsnews. 
com/stories/2005/11/20/opinion/polls/main1060315.shtml (providing poll data 
that reveals twenty-one percent of Americans ate at a restaurant for at least two or 
three meals in a week, and that seventeen percent of the same group polled for the 
same time frame had eaten at fast food establishments). 
 237. 21 U.S.C.A. § 350d(b)(1). 
 238. See Lovett, supra note 3, at 478 n.121 (citing Kellogg Co. v. Mattox, 763 F. 
Supp. 1369 (N.D. Tex. 1991), for the proposition that the oversight and 
administration of these facilities falls under the jurisdiction of the individual states, 
not the federal government, to provide one reason for the exemption in section 305 
registration). 
 239. See id. at 478 n.120 (noting from her research of the legislative history of the 
Bioterrorism Act that there is little clarification as to why the exemptions are in 
place, but at least some indication that Congress members may have considered 
registration of these facilities “unnecessary” for the Bioterrorism Act as a whole to be 
effective).  Lovett cites to a public document recording part of the Senate 
amendments to the Act in its initial stages in support.  Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 107-
3448 (2001). 
 240. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
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III allow various avenues for bioterrorists to strike the food supply.  
Therefore, no risk assessment may ever adequately support the need 
for Title III as a sanitary measure because of the inherent flaws that 
render it ineffective. 
III. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE:  IMPLICATIONS OF THE WTO VIOLATION 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FUTURE BIOTERRORISM PLAN THAT IS 
BOTH EFFECTIVE AND INTERNATIONALLY SENSITIVE 
As demonstrated above, persuasive arguments can be made that 
Title III of the Bioterrorism Act violates the WTO SPS Agreement.  
First, Title III discriminates against foreign food imports in violation 
of Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the Agreement and erects administrative 
barriers to trade.241  Moreover, the measure is unsupported by an 
assessment of risk as required under Article 5.1.242  These violations 
are significant:  the majority of disputes under the SPS Agreement 
have focused on either a failure to conduct or sufficiently base a 
measure on a risk assessment, or a breach of the Agreement’s non-
discrimination principles.243   
The Bioterrorism Act as written specifically requires both of the 
trade-restrictive measures in question.244  Consequently, the FDA 
cannot be less trade-restrictive in implementing the title because it is 
constrained by the language Congress selected.245  If Title III cannot 
be changed or implemented in a less trade-restrictive manner 
through agency regulation, it should be abandoned in order to 
remain consistent with WTO trade obligations. 
                                                          
 241. See supra Part II.B.1 (analyzing Title III under the three-part discrimination 
framework and concluding that because the measure arbitrarily imposes different 
levels of sanitary protection on domestic versus foreign-produced food products and 
the restriction negatively impacts foreign trade, it violates Article 5.5, and by 
implication Article 2.3, of the SPS Agreement). 
 242. See supra Part II.B.2 (evaluating the FDA Risk Assessment under a 
presumption that it would be offered in support of Title III, and determining that 
Title III is neither procedurally nor substantively based on the FDA assessment and 
therefore violates the risk assessment requirement of Article 5.1 of the SPS 
Agreement). 
 243. Davey, supra note 90, at 90. 
 244. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 350d, 381 (West 2006) (applying the registration and 
prior notice requirements by the letter of the legislation to all foreign 
manufacturers). 
 245. See, e.g., Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 58,915 
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (interim rule) (responding 
twice to suggestions to modify the U.S. agent requirements and recognizing that the 
FDA has acted consistently to structure the agent requirements by the plain language 
of the Bioterrorism Act, as Congress intended). 
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Should the legislation be retained, there is a significant risk that a 
dispute lodged against the United States in the WTO system would be 
successful.246  The “‘one very powerful, central element of the 
WTO . . . is its ability to deliver equity’ through dispute settlement.”247  
Overall, WTO members express overwhelming support for the 
dispute settlement system,248 despite a somewhat varied history with 
respect to enforcement of decisions.249  Generally, the United States 
has complied with WTO decisions250 and in this case, should an 
                                                          
 246. See supra Parts II.B.1-II.B.2 (making the case that Title III violates two articles 
of the SPS Agreement, either of which would support an adverse finding against the 
United States). 
 247. Daniel Pruzin & Christopher S. Rugaber, Officials Predict Rise in Dispute Cases 
at WTO After Collapse of Doha Trade Talks, 23 INT’L TRADE REP. 1124, 1124 (2006) 
(quoting Australia’s Trade Minister, Mark Vaile); see Daniel Kalderimis, Problems of 
WTO Harmonization and the Virtues of Shields Over Swords, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 
305, 311-12 (2004) (asserting that the dispute settlement mechanism is the most 
important instrument in the WTO’s arsenal and has helped it to achieve a level of 
institutional power that sets it apart from other international organizations).  
Kalderimis calls the system an “important success” and praises its mandatory, 
legalistic, and binding resolution of international trade disputes.  Id. 
 248. See Van der Borght, supra note 90, at 1225 (“If there is one point of 
agreement among the WTO [m]embers . . . it is their general satisfaction with the 
[dispute settlement] system.”); see also EPPING, supra note 92, at 49 (noting that even 
if a country does not agree with a decision of the WTO, it is always in the country’s 
best interest to remain within the WTO framework).  Van der Borght conveys 
numerous praises of the system.  She notes that the dispute settlement mechanism 
has strengthened the multilateral system as a whole, acting as a neutral and impartial 
body in which positive and satisfactory solutions are rendered.  Van der Borght, supra 
note 90, at 1225.  Its most frequent praise is that it provides a predictable, rules-based 
forum for resolution of disputes.  Id.  Additionally, complainants in the system are 
generally satisfied by successful rulings.  See Davey, supra note 90, at 80-81 (reviewing 
all 38 Panel and 28 Appellate Body reports from 1994 until 2000 to analyze member 
countries’ satisfaction with the system and its impact on members’ national powers); 
Pruzin & Rugaber, supra note 247, at 1124 (relaying comments that the dispute 
settlement process has increasingly worked well to resolve disagreements between 
WTO members).  
 249. For example, the EC hormone dispute is still raging.  See Daniel Pruzin & 
Gary G. Yerkey, WTO Approves U.S., Canada Sanctions on EU of $124.5 Million in Beef 
Hormone Dispute, 16 INT’L TRADE REP. 1158, 1158 (1999) (conveying the WTO 
approval of trade sanctions imposed upon the EC by the United States and Canada 
because of the EC’s refusal to remove the import ban on hormone-treated beef).  In 
the most recent development, the EC has attempted to support its continued ban on 
hormone-treated meat imports with a new risk assessment.  See Daniel Pruzin, U.S., 
Canada Fault EU Risk Assessment in WTO Dispute Over Hormone-Treated Beef, 23 INT’L 
TRADE REP. 1455, 1455 (2006) (reporting arguments that the European Union has 
once again failed to produce scientific evidence in the form of a risk assessment 
sufficient to support its ban). 
 250. E.g., Esther Lam, U.S. to Implement WTO Decision that Rejected Use of Zeroing 
Method, 23 INT’L TRADE REP. 1203 (2006); see Esther Lam, EU Will Not Appeal WTO 
DRAMs Ruling; U.S. Will Implement Korea CVD Decision, 22 INT’L TRADE REP. 1305 
(2005) (stating that both the European Union and the United States will comply with 
WTO rulings in favor of Korea’s free export of dynamic random access memory 
semiconductors (DRAMs)); see also Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 
2004, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 110-11 (2004) (reporting that in 2004 the 
United States made “significant progress towards compliance in several outstanding 
BOISEN_OFFTOPRINTER 1/30/2007  12:45:09 PM 
2007] TITLE III OF THE BIOTERRORISM ACT 717 
adverse ruling on Title III be rendered, there are strong motivations 
to compel continued U.S. compliance with the Agreement.  
Foremost, the United States is currently engaged in ongoing 
disputes over important U.S. products and needs support from the 
WTO system to pursue favorable trade remedies in these cases.251  The 
United States has a strong interest in ensuring that other WTO 
members comply with adverse rulings and respect the authority of the 
system as a whole and should, therefore, set the example by its own 
compliance.  Furthermore, the WTO allows members to impose 
sanctions against countries who fail to reduce barriers to trade after 
an unsuccessful dispute.252  Given the broad scope of Title III, which is 
applicable to all foreign nations that import food products into the 
United States, retaliatory sanctions in aggregate could be crippling. 
In addition, the option of diplomacy always remains.  The United 
States can mend bridges, broken by the restrictive Title III, by 
approaching food security in the future on an international level.  
International cooperation that takes both bioterrorism and trade 
concerns into account may ease tensions between the United States 
and trading partners and prevent a dispute from being lodged in the 
dispute settlement system.  This is not only a cooperative and 
diplomatic solution, but also an effective one.  The most efficient way 
to truly achieve global bioterrorism awareness, prevention, and 
preparedness, for both the United States and the world, is through 
                                                          
cases”).  But see Yerkey, supra note 15, at 19 (quoting EC allegations that “the U.S. 
record of ‘prompt compliance’ with dispute settlement rulings issued by the World 
Trade Organization has been poor”).  Yerkey notes, however, that of the seventeen 
adverse WTO rulings, the United States has only failed to comply, or been forced to 
comply after subsequent proceedings, with six of those decisions.  Id. 
 251. See Bhala & Gantz, supra note 250, at 178-98 (discussing the most recent 
decision, favoring the United States, by the Appellate Body in the United States-
Canada softwood lumber dispute, the longest-running trade dispute between the two 
nations that has persisted for twenty-three years).  Another example is clearly 
depicted in the EC hormone dispute.  While the United States has secured approval 
for sanctions against the EC, continued support from the WTO system is needed to 
maintain such measures.  See Pruzin, supra note 249, at 1455-56 (describing how the 
EC has recently initiated proceedings against the United States and Canada, 
attempting to force these countries to lift the punitive sanctions in place against the 
EC); see also Bhala & Gantz, supra note 250, at 114-16 (noting that the principal issue 
with the EC’s compliance in the WTO system is still the hormone problem, and that 
the United States remains unconvinced that it should terminate its efforts against the 
EC ban). 
 252. See EPPING, supra note 92, at 49 (explaining that the system of punishment 
under the WTO is in the form of punitive tariffs, intended to compensate damaged 
countries for losses caused by trade-restricting member); Pruzin & Yerkey, supra note 
249, at 1158 (describing the details of the WTO-approved sanctions against the 
European Union for its continued maintenance of a beef import ban). 
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intergovernmental organizations.253  In Europe, progress is already 
underway to pool available resources and knowledge and unite the 
many nations with bioterrorism concerns.254  The United States 
should cooperate with the governments of other nations and 
intergovernmental agencies to form any future plans for future 




                                                          
 253. See Fidler, supra note 2, at 13-14 (predicting that the anthrax attacks may 
bring “back from the dead” the former international attempts to negotiate a 
Biological Weapons Convention to create protocol for responding to bioterrorist 
incidents globally and synchronize efforts to prepare for catastrophic terrorism using 
biological weapons); Interpol Media Release, Bio-Terrorism Conference Opens with 
Warning of Major Threat:  Interpol Member Countries Seek Co-ordinated Global Response, 
Mar. 1, 2005, http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/PressReleases/PR2005/PR 
200510.asp (quoting the Interpol Secretary General Ronald K. Noble, who describes 
bioterrorism as “‘[a] global threat that requires a global response’”).  Interpol is the 
world’s largest international police organization and boasts membership from over 
184 countries worldwide.  The organization aims to facilitate international police 
cooperation even where diplomatic relations between nations are not particularly 
strong, in the interest of preventing international acts of crime.  See Interpol Website, 
About Interpol, http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/default.asp (last visited Nov. 
10, 2006).  But see Alexander, supra note 13, at 88-89 (maintaining that it is “generally 
easier to take steps at home than it is to promote international action”).  Alexander 
questions the immediate efficiency of international efforts, but does not discount the 
advantages of international bioterrorism cooperation.  Id.  Indeed, he ultimately 
notes that many governments have pursued international measures to deal with acts 
of terrorism and bioterrorism alike.  Id. at 88. 
 254. See Interpol Media Release, supra note 253 (describing recent efforts in 2005 
to organize a global solution to the global problem of bioterrorism).  The Global 
Bioterrorism Conference, held by Interpol, saw over 150 countries in attendance to 
learn more about the growing problem of bioterrorism and to discuss how to attack 
bioterrorism on domestic levels, but also as part of an international team.  Preventing 
and fighting bioterrorism worldwide is one of Interpol’s highest priority concerns, 
and the Bioterrorism Conference was a part of its most public ventures to increase 
international cooperation and work towards a global prevention plan.  At a press 
conference following the Bioterrorism Conference, Interpol President Jackie Selebi 
declared, “‘[w]e must build bridges . . . [to] prevent bio-terrorism through sustained 
communication with international law enforcement to mitigate the risks we are 
facing.  Interpol and police services around the world must be part of a broader 
integrated response to combat the threat of biological weapons.’”  Interpol Media 
Release, Interpol Conference Agrees on Measures to Fight Bio-Terrorism:  Emphasis on 
Training Police, Better International Cooperation, Mar. 2, 2005, http://www.interpol/ 
int/Public/ICPO/PressReleases/PR2005/PR200511.asp. 
